Goldstein v. Ray

California Court of Appeal Apr 30, 1981 No. Civ. 59675Published

Before: Kingsley

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Holding. The court held that a lis pendens provides constructive notice to a subsequent lessee of a term exceeding one year, rendering such a lease void under Civil Code section 1214 against a party who subsequently obtains a judgment affecting title.

Issues

Whether the filing of a lis pendens constitutes constructive notice to a subsequent lessee of a five-year lease.
Whether a lease for a term exceeding one year is a 'conveyance' subject to the provisions of Civil Code section 1214.
Whether a judgment in a specific performance action relates back to the date of the lis pendens, granting it priority over a subsequent leasehold interest.

Disposition. reversed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The notice of action puts a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer on constructive notice that the property is involved in litigation.”

“The lease involved here was for five years and clearly falls within the ambit of the code section.”

[574]

Opinion

KINGSLEY, J.

This appeal arises from judgment in an unlawful detainer action filed by appellants seeking to terminate respondents’ five-year lease. The trial court held that respondents were not unlawfully detaining the premises and entered judgment in their favor. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment. For the reasons set forth below we reverse.

The issue on appeal is whether the filing of a lis pendens is constructive notice to a subsequent lessee and therefore binding on him, and, if so, whether the trial court properly applied the doctrine. The case was tried on stipulated facts as set forth.

On June 21, 1976, appellants and Leslie Bereny entered into a written agreement, pursuant to which appellants agreed to purchase and Bereny agreed to sell a commercial building. Mr. Bereny refused to carry out that agreement and as a result on August 31, 1976, appellants recorded a lis pendens giving notice of the commencement of the action. On February 14, 1979, appellants obtained a judgment for specific performance pursuant to a stipulation to the entry of judgment. Appellants obtained a grant deed which was recorded on April 13, 1979.

On September 1, 1978, prior to the judgment in the Bereny action but subsequent to the recordation of the lis pendens, Mr. Bereny entered into a written five-year lease (with an option to purchase the property) with respondents. Respondents spent $20,000 to prepare the premises for their occupation.

In October 1978, prior to respondents’ occupation of the premises, appellants learned of the lease and notified respondents of the pendency of the action. Respondents nevertheless took possession.

On April 13, 1979, upon obtaining title to the property, appellants served respondents with a 30-day notice terminating respondents’ tenancy in the premises. Upon respondents’ failure to vacate, appellants brought this unlawful detainer action. The trial court held respondents had not unlawfully detained the property and entered judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.

Civil Code section 1214 provides the means by which a person may protect his interest in real property while the property is involved in litigation. Appellants filed their notice of action two years before

Goldstein v. Ray

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KINGSLEY, J.

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