Staley v. California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board

Opinion

ROTH, P. J.

Betty Staley appeals from a judgment denying a writ of mandamus which was entered on January 13,1969.

Briefly summarized, the facts are as follows:

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Appellant worked as a nurse’s aide for 11 days between January 30, 1967, and February 19, 1967. She left, either voluntarily or because she was laid off. She previously had applied for and received unemployment benefits which included benefits for the 11-day working period mentioned and she did not report her earnings for that period.

On November 20, 1967, the Department of Employment (Department) determined that she received an overpayment of benefits for the period in question.

On November 22, 1967, appellant appealed the decision and requested a hearing. The hearing was calendared before a referee of the Department.

The hearing before the referee was held on December 19, 1967, and January 15,1968, and on January 30, 1968, the referee upheld the decision of the Department.

Appellant requested a hearing before the Appeals Board. She was represented on this appeal by counsel from the Los Angeles Neighborhood Legal Services Society. On the reverse of the form provided by the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, transmitted to appellant, the following statement appears in small, light gray type: “Representation. If a representative is employed by you to present the appeal, you must pay his fees. Fees charged a claimant in a benefit proceeding are subject to approval by the Referee.” On November 30, 1967, appellant was sent a notice of hearing on the back of which the same statement appeared. On April 24, 1968, the Appeals Board affirmed the decision of the referee.

Thereafter, on December 4,1968, appellant petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandamus pursuant to section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This appeal followed the denial of that writ.

In her petition for mandate before the superior court and on this appeal, the findings of the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board have not been directly challenged. Rather, appellant’s argument is that the administrative proceedings must be set aside because she was denied due process because she was not provided with the aid of counsel. In the alternative, appellant argues that at a minimum she should have been advised of her right to have counsel at the hearing and that if she could not afford to privately obtain counsel, there were available a number of groups and organizations whose purpose is to provide legal counsel to those who cannot afford to hire private counsel.