Harris v. Superior Court

Opinion

ELKINGTON, Acting P. J.

We issued an alternative writ of mandate in order to consider the validity of the superior court’s order disqualifying Attorney Nathaniel S. Colley from serving as trial counsel for petitioners Sandra Harris and Phillip Harris in their actions against real parties in interest, Hospital Service of California and Blue Cross of California (hereafter collectively, Blue Cross), and Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (hereafter Kaiser Foundation).

[491]

In the superior court the following factual context appeared.

Petitioners are wife and husband. They and their three children were injured in an automobile accident in November 1974. The family was covered by medical insurance policies written by Kaiser Foundation and Blue Cross. The Blue Cross policy provided for reduction of benefits to the extent the insured was covered by other insurance. Kaiser Foundation’s policy contained a subrogation clause providing for reimbursement from any recovery from a tortfeasor making necessary its medical care.

In the automobile accident petitioners and their children were rendered unconscious and were taken to, and furnished substantial medical services by, hospitals other than that of Kaiser Foundation to which they were later removed.

Petitioners, represented by their attorney, Nathaniel S. Colley, commenced a personal injury action against the driver of the other car of the accident, against whom they recovered judgment for $827,000. From the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier they were paid the amount of his $100,000 coverage, and from the tortfeasor himself $55,000, which sums partially satisfied the judgment.

Petitioners, again represented by Nathaniel S. Colley, thereafter commenced actions in the superior court against Kaiser Foundation, and Blue Cross, seeking compensatory and punitive damages for failure to perform under their respective policies, and damages for “emotional upset, worry, and humiliation . . . .” As to Kaiser Foundation the action appeared predicated upon its demand for full reimbursement from the limited satisfaction of the judgment, and its failure to pay the charges of the hospitals to which members of petitioners’ family were first taken after the accident. As to Blue Cross the action seems concerned with a claimed nonpayment of some $30,000 of medical and hospital expenses.