Santos v. City of Brawley

Opinion

BROWN (Gerald), P. J.

Plaintiff John Santos appeals an order sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer of defendants City of Brawley (City), Brawley City Council (Council) and Brawley City Manager Ken Knight to his petition for writ of mandate and to compel arbitration and denying as moot his motion for writ of mandate and to compel arbitration.

[205]

I

The Council fired appointed Police Chief Santos “in the interest of and to restore overall harmony in City administration and within the police department.” Asserting his right under Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b) to an administrative appeal of his termination, Santos asked the City for “impartial, final, and binding third-party arbitration” under City resolution 3176.

The City did not submit the matter to arbitration. Instead, the Council held a hearing on Santos’ appeal. At the hearing Santos presented evidence about the disharmony assertedly underlying his dismissal; Santos also contended the hearing before the Council was legally inadequate. After hearing, the Council found Santos was employed at its pleasure and affirmed its decision to fire him.

II

Santos petitioned the superior court for mandate and to compel arbitration. Seeking mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, Santos alleged in his first cause of action: Fired from his job as a permanent sworn police officer, Santos was entitled to an administrative appeal under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq.); as a person regularly employed by the City, Santos was entitled to a full and fair evidentiary hearing before an impartial arbitrator under the City’s grievance procedure; despite his requests, the City did not give Santos such hearing before an impartial arbitrator; and without a writ of mandate ordering such arbitration hearing Santos would be deprived of his property, liberty and statutory and contractual vested fundamental rights without due process of law. Seeking arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure section 1280 et seq., Santos’ second cause of action alleged as a term and condition of his employment the City’s grievance procedure was an agreement to arbitrate his dismissal. Seeking administrative mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, Santos alleged in his third cause of action: The Council’s decision after hearing affirming his termination was not a final administrative decision because the City was still required to submit the matter to arbitration under the City’s grievance procedure; however, if such decision was a final administrative decision, the Council denied Santos due process by reviewing its own decision to terminate him instead of having an unbiased decisionmaker conduct an adjudicatory hearing; and the Council prejudicially abused its discretion by making improper rulings at the hearing.