Fearon v. Department of Corrections

Opinion

THE COURT.

*

Clifford D. Fearon appeals from a judgment on the pleadings dismissing his complaint for conversion of a silver belt buckle based upon the governmental immunity provisions of Government Code section

[1256]

844.6. Fearon argues on appeal that he was not a “prisoner” within the terms of section 844.6 at the time the conversion took place and is not, therefore, barred from bringing this action.

When reviewing judgments entered on the pleadings, a court indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of appellant’s claim.

(Crain

v.

Electronic Memories

&

Magnetics Corp.

(1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 509, 512 [123 Cal.Rptr. 419].) With this standard in mind, the following facts from appellant’s complaint are considered.

Appellant was incarcerated in several state prisons between the dates of October 9, 1970, and December 5, 1975. When he first entered prison, his silver belt buckle, valued by him at $200,000, was taken by prison officials for safekeeping until his release. After he was released on parole on December 5, Fearon demanded his property and was told that it had been lost. After various futile attempts to obtain his property, Fearon filed the instant complaint on February 6, 1978, alleging negligent loss of the property and conversion.

The superior court granted the state’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the complaint based solely upon the immunity set forth in Government Code section 844.6.

Fearon argues that because he was paroled prior to the time the state refused to return his property, he was not a “prisoner” and therefore, the statutory immunity does not apply. The relevant portion of Government Code section 844.6 provides: “a public entity is not liable for: (1) An injury proximately caused by any prisoner. (2) An injury to any prisoner.” The term “prisoner” is defined in Government Code section 844 as including: “an inmate of a prison, jail or penal or correctional facility.” In the legislative committee comment following section 844, it is stated that “a person on parole would not be considered to be a prisoner.” (See legis. committee com., Deering’s Ann. Gov. Code (1982 ed.), § 844, p. 317.)