Watt v. Kantel

Opinion

GUSTAFSON, J.

Alice A. Kantel (hereinafter the mother) died June 27, 1964, leaving a will dated April 21, 1961, as modified by a codicil executed a few days before her death. The will purports to dispose of three parcels of real property. One (a ranch) was devised to her son, defendant Frederick W. Kantel. Another (also a ranch) was devised to defendant’s two sons. The third (the homeplace where the mother lived) was to be divided into two parcels, the larger of which was to go to the mother’s only surviving daughter and the smaller of which was to be sold. The proceeds from the sale of the smaller parcel were to be used to discharge an existing encumbrance and the balance of the proceeds was to be divided equally among the daughter, the daughter’s son and the two daughters of a deceased daughter of the testatrix.

Defendant claimed that his mother had no interest in the homeplace at her death because by deed of October 27, 1961, she conveyed the property to him. Thereupon, the daughter, her son and the two daughters of the deceased daughter brought this action to set aside the conveyance on the ground of undue influence and fraud.

On the trial of the case before the court sitting without a jury, the court granted defendant’s motion for judgment, after plaintiffs rested their case in chief, pursuant to section 631.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

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[252]

Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment were signed by the court.

Plaintiffs moved for a new trial upon three grounds and the motion was granted on the basis that each of the three grounds independently of the others furnished a basis for a new trial. Defendant appeals from that order. It follows that if we find that any one ground is sufficient, we need not examine the others. We find that the first ground (insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision) is sufficient and we therefore do not consider the other two grounds.

Defendant correctly notes that a judgment in favor of the moving party pursuant to section 631.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure necessarily means that the trial court has weighed the evidence in reaching its conclusion. Because the trial court may not grant a motion for a new trial upon the ground of insufficiency of the evidence to justify the decision “unless after weighing the evidence the court is convinced from the entire record, including reasonable inferences therefrom, that the court . . . clearly should have reached a different . . . decision” (Code Civ. Proc., § 657), defendant argues that because the motion for a new trial was granted, the trial court “made no effort to weigh the evidence, but instead interpreted the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs-respondents.” The unstated premise of this argument is that the same judge weighing the same evidence could not reach one result one time and an opposite result another time.