Myers v. Mobil Oil Corp.

California Court of Appeal Oct 2, 1985 No. B009501Published

Before: Roth

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Holding. The court held that a plaintiff cannot bypass the Department of Fair Employment and Housing to sue for breach of a settlement agreement arising from an employment discrimination claim without first exhausting administrative remedies. The Department retains primary authority to enforce such agreements, and failure to invoke this administrative process precludes judicial intervention.

Issues

Whether a plaintiff may file a civil action for breach of a settlement agreement under the Fair Employment and Housing Act without first exhausting administrative remedies.
Whether the plaintiff's claim regarding the December 17, 1980, charge was barred by the one-year statute of limitations under Government Code section 12965.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.”

“it is also clear appellant failed to satisfy the fundamental prerequisite of exhausting his administrative remedies prior to filing his action in the trial court”

“that agreement may not be considered in a vacuum nor may its breach ipso facto permit appellant to pursue his own civil action for redress without further reference to the Department”

Opinion

ROTH, P. J.

On May 21, 1979, appellant Donald Myers filed a charge of race discrimination with the California Division of Fair Employment Practices (now the Department of Fair Employment and Housing; the Department), alleging that his then employer, respondent Mobil Oil Corporation, had committed acts of discrimination against him based on his race, in violation of the provisions of the Fair Employment Practice Act (former Lab. Code, § 1410 et seq., recodified at Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq., and

[1061]

renamed the Fair Employment and Housing Act). Appellant’s administrative action resulted in a settlement agreement entered into in May 1980, which provided in pertinent part that: “In exchange for the promise made by the Respondent contained in this agreement, the Complainant agrees to withdraw from consideration by any state or federal agency or other governmental entity any charge or complaint of discrimination in employment or other claim relating to illegal discrimination in employment which are now pending on Complainant’s behalf against the Respondent.

“Further, Complainant will not institute or cause to be instituted any action in state or federal court arising from or attributable to any alleged unlawful employment practice of the Respondent arising from or attributable to the above-described complaint on the facts alleged in that complaint.

“In exchange for the promises of the Complainant and the Department of Fair Employment & Housing, State of California, contained in this agreement, the Respondent agrees to:

“1. Remove specified derogatory materials from the personnel file of Complainant.

“2. Guarantee Complainant equal terms and conditions of employment.

“3. Submit a copy of Respondent’s affirmative action plan and progress statement to Department of Fair Employment & Housing within 60 days of execution of this agreement.

On November 5, 1980, appellant was discharged by respondent. On December 17, 1980, he filed a second charge of race discrimination with the Department, again alleging that respondent had committed various acts of discrimination against him. On September 28, 1981, the Department issued a notice to Myers informing him that it would not issue an accusation against respondent because of insufficient evidence to prove a violation of the act, and that Myers had one year from the date of the notice to bring an action in superior court on his discrimination claim.

Myers v. Mobil Oil Corp.

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ROTH, P. J.

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