People v. Salas

Opinion

WIENER, J.

*

On retrial, after this court reversed a judgment convicting defendant of the robbery of Guadalupe Escobar (Pen. Code, § 211),

1

a jury again found defendant guilty of such offense, which was determined to be second degree robbeiy as a matter of law. The jury also found true the allegation of the second amended information that defendant, during the commission of the offense, intentionally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim (Pen. Code, § 213). Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law, such sentence to run consecutively “with any other sentence the defendant may be obligated to serve as a result of any prior convictions.” Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, urging four grounds for reversal.

I

Defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied him the constitutional right to represent himself. In

Faretta

v.

California

(1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct 2525] the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant in a state criminal trial has a federal constitutional right to represent himself without counsel

if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.

“When an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter, many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel. For this reason, in order to represent himself, the accused must ‘knowingly and intelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits.”

(Faretta

v.

California, supra,

422 U.S. at p. 835 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 581].)

[604]

The record herein shows: When the case was set for retrial, defendant told the court (Judge Ruffner) that he wished to represent himself. Upon learning that defendant does not read, speak or understand English, the court pointed out to defendant that he would be at a serious disadvantage in representing himself. When defendant nevertheless expressed a desire to proceed in pro. per., the court appointed two psychiatrists (Dr. Harvey and Dr. Sheel) to examine defendant and report to the court whether he was able intelligently to waive his right to counsel. Following the psychiatric examinations, a hearing was held on defendant’s petition to proceed in pro. per. At that hearing, the written reports of the psychiatrists were received in evidence. In his report, Dr. Harvey concluded that defendant was unable knowingly and intelligently to waive representation by counsel because of: (1) low intelligence; (2) impaired capacity for abstract thought; (3) lack of insight into his own psychological and intellectual limitations; (4) lack of comprehension of what competent counsel can and cannot do for him; and (5) significant language impediments. In his report, Dr. Sheel expressed the opinion that defendant had the mental capacity knowingly and intelligently to waive the right to counsel because he was not psychotic and was of average intelligence. However, Dr. Sheel testified that defendant was a “paranoid individual” and wished to defend himself because he was “very suspicious of the court process, very suspicious of the court appointing an attorney to be in charge of his case, and certainly his suspiciousness I don’t think is justified . ...” At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ruffner found that defendant was not able intelligently to waive his right to counsel. Accordingly, he denied defendant’s petition to proceed in propria persona. Throughout the ensuing retrial (before Judge Pollack), defendant was represented by the public defender.