People v. Terflinger

Opinion

GARDNER, P. J.

Defendants pleaded guilty to attempted escape from prison (Pen. Code, § 4530, subd. (b)) and were sentenced to prison. Each contends that Penal Code section 4530, subdivision (b), denied him equal protection of the laws because it imposes the same penalty for both attempted escape and the escape itself.

The concept of equal protection is that persons similarly situated with respect to the legislative purpose of the law receive like treatment.

(In re Gary W.,

5 Cal.3d 296, 303 [96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201].) Since sentencing has a relationship to a defendant’s personal liberty, the defendant’s interest in sentencing is fundamental.

(People

v.

Olivas,

17

[304]

Cal.3d 236 [131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375].) Thus, the state must establish that it has a

compelling

interest which justifies the law and the state must demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by law are

necessary

to further that purpose.

(Olivas, supra,

at p. 251.) This, the state has done insofar as Penal Code section 4530, subdivision (b) is concerned.

The Legislature has determined in its sound discretion that for purposes of prison discipline, attempts and completed escapes are to be treated equally. There is a sound basis for such a determination. Attempted escapes may well be as disruptive to prison discipline as completed escapes. Certainly, they may be equally dangerous. Thus, there is a compelling interest which justifies this law and the distinction drawn is necessary for its purpose. An escape or an attempted escape can in no way be compared to a murder or attempted murder. The two concepts are light years apart. There is no denial of equal protection of the law in the punishment provisions of Penal Code section 4530, subdivision (b).