Conservatorship of Munson
Before: Staniforth
[517]
Opinion
STANIFORTH, Acting P. J.
The trial court found 81-year-old Charles C. Munson to be “gravely disabled” within the provisions of the conservatorship chapter of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (LPS). (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5350 et seq.) Munson was “disoriented to time, place and circumstance.” His diagnosis was (1) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, (2) congestive heart failure, stable, and (3) organic brain syndrome with dementia. The court appointed H. N. Welborn as conservator of Munson’s
person
for a period of one year under chapter 3 of LPS.
As required by LPS, one year later Welborn filed and served his notice of filing of “Petition to Reestablish Conservatorship of Person” of Munson. The conservatorship was by court order reestablished on March 23, 1977. While this latter petition to reestablish conservatorship was pending, Munson by his counsel filed a written notice to compel an
accounting
by Welborn as conservator of Munson’s person. The trial court denied Munson’s motion holding that Probate Code section 1904 applied to the conservatorships of estates, not to conservatorships of persons. This appeal followed.
LPS section 5350 states: “The procedure for establishing, administering and terminating conservatorship under this chapter shall be the same as that provided in Division 5 (commencing with Section 1701) of the Probate Code, except as follows: . . .” The exceptions set forth are not applicable here.
Probate Code (div. 5) section 1904, provides: “At the expiration of one year from the time of his appointment, and thereafter not less frequently than biennially, unless otherwise ordered by the court, the conservator must
present his account to the court for settlement and allowance.
When an account is rendered by or on behalf of two or more joint conservators, the court, in its discretion, may settle and allow the same upon the verification of any of them.” (Italics added.) Mun-son’s counsel asserts that the express language of this code section mandates the LPS conservator of the person to render an accounting yet he concedes that historically, accountability “was oriented around estate matters” and “directed to the roles of surrogate managers of estates not persons.”
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