Taylor v. Superior Court

Opinion

HANING, J.

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to require respondent court to grant his motion for appointment of a fingerprint expert to assist in his defense. We conclude he is entitled to this relief.

Petitioner is a criminal defendant charged with a residential burglary. He is represented by Mission Community Legal Defense (MCLD), an organization which provides free legal service for eligible indigent and substantially low income residents of the Mission District in San Francisco.

At his preliminary hearing, the only evidence against petitioner were fingerprints which were lifted from a plate in the burglarized house and matched with petitioner’s prints. After the preliminary hearing, petitioner

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applied for the court appointment of David Stoney of the Institute of Forensic Science as an expert witness on fingerprint analysis. In a declaration supporting the application, petitioner’s attorney stated that the cost of Stoney’s services, not including testifying at trial, would be approximately $300. Respondent court agreed that the expert was appropriate, but denied the application stating that MCLD should use its own funds or petitioner should apply to the public defender for representation. At a later hearing, testimony revealed that MCLD receives funds from federal sources, but these funds are budgeted by the mayor’s office of development which does not permit the use of funds for expert witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, respondent court expressed its opinion that the county should not be required to furnish funds to a federally funded agency.

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According to the court’s view, if this places petitioner in a position where he cannot obtain adequate defense, his alternative is to apply to the public defender who can provide a complete and adequate defense.

In

People

v.

Worthy

(1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 514 [167 Cal.Rptr. 402], the court had occasion to consider by what authority a trial court could appoint publicly funded experts to assist in the preparation of the defense of a criminal defendant represented by private pro bono counsel. The court and the parties recognized that neither Evidence Code section 730 which authorizes the court to appoint experts to testify or Penal Code section 987.2 which authorizes the payment of attorney’s fees to appointed counsel specifically covered the situation before it. The court, however, held that authority derived from the fact that an indigent criminal defendant is entitled under the federal Constitution to effective assistance of counsel.