People v. Knighten

California Court of Appeal Apr 22, 1980 No. Crim. 19195Published

Before: Christian

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Holding. The court held that a defendant's admission of prior convictions is invalid without an explicit on-the-record advisement of constitutional rights and consequences, and that while a judge's private communication with a jury is constitutional error, it may be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if the record shows no prejudice to the defendant's substantial rights.

Issues

Whether an admission of prior felony convictions is valid without an explicit on-the-record advisement of constitutional rights and potential sentencing consequences.
Whether a trial judge's private communication with a jury during deliberations constitutes reversible error.

Disposition. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Yurko does not permit use of such a process of inference to dispense with the requirement that an explicit statement of rights and of the consequences of any ensuing waiver must be placed on the record.”

“Any private communication between judge and jury is improper”

“In light of these proceedings we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error implicit in the trial judge’s visit to the jury room was harmless.”

Opinion

CHRISTIAN, J.

Jay Donald Knighten appeals from a judgment of imprisonment which was rendered after a jury found him guilty of sale of cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352).

There is no challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. The prosecution’s evidence may be summarized as showing that a citizen volunteer, Alison Seever, arranged through a police officer, Schepp, for police surveillance of a planned cocaine transaction between appellant and Seever. Appellant sold cocaine to Seever and was immediately arrested. The jury rejected appellant’s entrapment defense.

The information contained allegations that appellant had suffered two prior felony convictions. At first, appellant denied the priors. At a later hearing, the court ruled that the priors would not be admissible for the purpose of impeachment (see

People

Beagle

(1972) 6 Cal.3d 441 [99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1]) but that they could be used for the purpose of enhancing the penalty if appellant were found guilty. Before trial commenced, appellant admitted the priors.

On appeal appellant contends, citing

In re Yurko

(1974) 10 Cal.3d 857 [112 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519 P.2d 516], that the admission of priors was ineffective because the court did not expressly and specifically inform appellant of the constitutional rights being waived by an admission and because there was no advice concerning the precise increase in penalty which might result. (See

In re Yurko, supra,

10 Cal.3d at p. 864.) The record supports this contention. The Attorney General points out that the validity of the priors was contested in pretrial hearings, and suggests an inference that appellant must have been aware of his rights and of the adverse consequences of admitting the priors.

Yurko

does not permit use of such a process of inference to dispense with the requirement that an explicit statement of rights and of the consequences of any ensuing waiver must be placed on the record. The priors resulted in a two-year enhancement of appellant’s term.

People v. Knighten

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CHRISTIAN, J.

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