In Re Marriage of Hoffee

Opinion

CHRISTIAN, J.

Marilyn Iris Hoffee (hereinafter “wife”) appeals from an order denying her requests that Marvin Dale Hoffee (hereinafter “husband”) be compelled to execute an assignment of wages to secure payment of support arrearages and to pay interest on the arrearages which have accrued according to the terms of a decree of marital dissolution. No contention has been presented concerning the request that qii assignment of wages be compelled.

The decree of dissolution ordered husband to pay wife alimony and child support. Thereafter the obligation to pay alimony was terminated, but there is a continuing obligation to pay child support. It is undisputed that there are arrearages on the judgment and that husband has not been paying interest on the judgment.

Wife contends that under California Constitution article XX, section 22, she is entitled to receive interest at the legal rate of 7 percent on all amounts due under the judgment. Husband contends that in a marital cause the award of interest on the judgment is discretionary with the court.

Code of Civil Procedure section 1033 provides that the clerk or judge

must

include in the judgment “entered up” any interest on the judgment “from the1 time it was rendered or made, . . .” The question is

[339]

whether section 1033 applies to all judgments calling for the payment of money, or only to judgments rendered in civil actions for damages. In

Wuest

v.

Wuest

(1945) 72 Cal.App.2d 101, 112 [164 P.2d 32], a marital cause, the court applied section 1033, holding: “A judgment bears interest from its date unless the contrary appears. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033;

McNabb

v.

McNabb,

47 Cal.App.2d 623, 627 [118 P.2d 869].)” (To the same effect, see