People v. Jacob M.

Opinion

SONENSHINE, J.

Jacob M. was committed to the California Youth Authority after the court found he committed the offense of burglary (Pen. Code, § 459), among others, Jacob appealed, contending the court failed to designate the degree of burglary and to classify it as either a felony or a misdemeanor. We modified the judgment “to reflect a finding of second degree burglary. [It was] remanded for the court to designate the burglary as a felony or misdemeanor.”

(In re Jacob M.

(1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 58, 65 [240 Cal.Rptr. 418].) On remand, the minute order indicates the “court now designates Count 2 (459 PC second degree) to be a felony with a maximum treatment period of 3 years.” Jacob again appeals. He now argues the judgment must be reversed because the court failed to articulate specific reasons for its designation of the burglary as a felony rather than a misdemeanor.

[1180]

We are cited to no statute or decisional law requiring a trial court to state its reasons pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.

1

The statute by its terms demands only a declaration—a statement of the existence of either a felony or a misdemeanor.

On several occasions, our Supreme Court has addressed similar code sections and denied a minor’s contention that delineation of the trial court’s reasons was necessary.

In re John H.

(1978) 21 Cal.3d 18 [145 Cal.Rptr. 357, 577 P.2d 177] addressed section 734 which deals with the court’s commitment of a minor to the Youth Authority. There the order was “on a printed form which recited that the court had found (in the language of § 734) that appellant would probably benefit from the treatment provided by the Youth Authority.”

(Id.,

at p. 22.)

2

Appellant asserted that express findings indicating the reasons for the decision to commit him were necessary. The court stated there was “no statutory requirement that either the juvenile court or referee express the reasons which support a minor’s commitment to the Youth Authority.”