People v. Jonathan S.

Opinion

PUGLIA, P. J.

The minor appeals from the judgment (order of commitment to the California Youth Authority (CYA)) following his admission to the allegation that he committed robbery (Pen. Code, § 211).

The petition is in two counts. Count 1 alleges a single incident in which the minor robbed six victims while armed with a firearm; count 2 alleges the minor committed an assault with a deadly weapon upon the same six victims. (The minor did not challenge the formal sufficiency of the petition. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 656, subd. (f), 656.1; rule 1309(a)(6), Juvenile Court Rules, Cal. Rules of Court; cf. Pen. Code, § 1004, subd. 3).)

On June 13, 1977, the minor appeared before the referee and admitted count 1; the armed allegations and count 2 were dismissed. At the disposition hearing on June 28, 1977, the referee continued the minor as a ward and ordered him to participate in the juvenile court work project for 20 days commencing July 5, 1977.

On July 19, 1977, the juvenile court judge ordered a rehearing of the disposition proceedings. That judge was subsequently disqualified (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.6) and the rehearing was conducted before Judge Morgan who, on December 21, 1977, ordered the minor continued as a ward and committed him to the CYA.

It is conceded that the juvenile court judge has power to grant a rehearing on his own motion of any matter heard before a referee (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 253). Nor is it contended that the order was not timely. What is contended is that certain contacts of the district attorney with the juvenile court judge in the period between the referee’s disposition order and the order for rehearing constituted improper conduct on the part of the district attorney and vitiated the latter order.

It is not necessaiy to detail the alleged activities of the district attorney and judge in this interval in order to answer the minor’s contention.

[471]

Even assuming the impropriety of those activities as claimed by the minor, the latter has not been prejudiced thereby since the subsequent disposition hearing “was fully and fairly reheard de novo by a judge other than the one who ordered the rehearing.”