People v. John R.

Opinion

ASHBY, J.

In a proceeding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, the juvenile court found that appellant committed assault in violation of Penal Code section 240. Appellant was declared a ward and placed home on probation.

The victim, Roman Harris, testified that on the afternoon of March 20, 1978, as he was leaving a liquor store at 65th and Western, four people including appellant came up to him and started hitting him. Appellant

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was involved in the fight from the beginning, both in hitting Harris in the face with his fist and in holding Harris while the others hit him.

Appellant testified he acted in self-defense. Appellant testified that he was standing by the side of the building and that the fight, which involved five to six other youths, moved toward him. It was stipulated that the victim picked up a broken bottle to defend himself during the fight. Appellant admitted striking the victim with his fist on the shoulder but testified that he got involved because “[t]hey started swinging [the bottle] and was almost hitting me. So I just started fighting, you know, too.” Appellant’s testimony was consistent with that of Ralph Brown, the liquor store manager, who was inside the store and who testified for respondent. He stated that appellant was originally standing about eight yards away from where the fight started, that the other boys “fought [the victim] sort of around the corner” toward appellant and then appellant got involved in the fight.

The trial court obviously believed that the victim, Mr. Harris, was in a better position to observe the events and that his testimony was more credible than that of appellant or Mr. Brown. Under the usual rules of appellate review, the testimony of Mr. Harris is substantial evidence which supports the judgment, and appellant’s argument that he acted in self-defense cannot be sustained.

(In re Roderick P.,

7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809 [103 Cal.Rptr. 425, 500 P.2d 1].)

The court placed appellant home on probation. The court did not specify the length of probation, although it did place the matter on the nonappearance calendar to be reviewed in one year.