In Re DeMond

Opinion

COMPTON, J.

This habeas corpus proceeding presents the question of whether petitioner and presumptively 400 other prisoners sentenced to life under the indeterminate sentencing law (ISL) are entitled to be represented by counsel at hearings conducted to determine their parole release date pursuant to ISL criteria. We conclude that there is no right to counsel at those hearings and therefore deny the relief requested.

The relevant facts and law can be simply stated. In 1975, following a jury trial, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder.

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Pursuant to the ISL, he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

In 1977 the determinate sentencing law (DSL) took effect. It contained guidelines to be used in determining the parole release date for a life prisoner. Those guidelines, as we shall point out, were different than those that had previously been used under the ISL to set a parole release date.

[934]

In 1981, a hearing was conducted to set a parole release date for petitioner under DSL criteria. Petitioner was represented by counsel at that hearing and a release date of May 1, 1990, was selected.

In 1982, the California Supreme Court held that the state and federal constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws mandated that a life prisoner sentenced pursuant to the ISL be considered for parole release under the ISL pursuant to the administrative guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing

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under the DSL with its implementing regulations. The court concluded: “We do not suggest, in any manner, that defendant is entitled to an earlier release date, only that he is entitled to parole release consideration under both ISL and DSL standards. Defendant is entitled to a hearing and to the benefit of the earlier release date, if any, set pursuant to both standards. ”

(In re Stanworth

(1982) 33 Cal.3d 176, at p. 188 [187 Cal.Rptr. 783, 654 P.2d 1311].)