Hollis v. Superior Court

California Court of Appeal Mar 13, 1985 No. Civ. 24030Published

Before: Puglia

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Holding. The court held that a trial court does not abuse its discretion by granting a continuance beyond the 60-day statutory period for a joint trial when the delay is necessary to protect the codefendants' rights to adequate representation and a fair trial.

Issues

Whether a continuance granted to codefendants for trial preparation constitutes 'good cause' for delaying a defendant's trial beyond the 60-day statutory limit under Penal Code section 1382.
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion to dismiss when the defendant objected to a continuance requested by codefendants.

Disposition. denied

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Where a continuance is granted to a codefendant upon good cause, the rights of other jointly charged defendants are generally deemed not to have been prejudiced”

“Under the circumstances here there was good cause to continue petitioner’s case and the court did not err in denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss.”

Opinion

PUGLIA, P. J.

In his petition for writ of prohibition, Robert Dwayne Hollis seeks pretrial review of the respondent court’s denial of his motion to dismiss the murder charge against him pursuant to Penal Code section 1382. So far as relevant here, that section provides: “The court, unless good cause to the contrary is shown, must order the action to be dismissed in the following cases: .... [f] 2. When a defendant is not brought to trial in a superior court within 60 days after the finding of the indictment or filing of the information . . . .”

On February 21, 1984, the district attorney filed an information jointly charging petitioner, his brother Ellis Hollis, Clarence Phillips, and Mitchell Thomas with murder. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) Trial was set for April 17, 1984, 56 days after the filing of the information.

On March 29, 1984, Ellis Hollis moved for continuance on the ground there was insufficient time for his appointed counsel to prepare adequately for trial. Defendants Phillips and Thomas joined in the motion and, together with Ellis Hollis, waived time. Petitioner objected to the continuance and demanded trial as originally scheduled. When the court raised the possibility of trying petitioner separately, counsel for petitioner indicated that a separate trial was of no tactical advantage to petitioner and disavowed any intention to force a severance. Thereupon, the court continued the case to May 31, 1984, 100 days after the filing of the information.

On May 22, 1984, petitioner moved under Penal Code section 1382 to dismiss the information as to him. The trial court denied the motion. Each

[645]

of the other defendants later pled guilty to false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236), as charged in the amended information.

The policy favoring seasonable disposition of criminal cases is stated in Penal Code section 1050, subdivision (a): “The welfare of the people of the State of California requires that all proceedings in criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest possible time. . . . It is therefore recognized that both the people and the defendant have the right to an expeditious disposition, and to that end it shall be the duty of all courts and judicial officers and of all counsel, both the prosecution and the defense, to expedite such proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice. ...”

Hollis v. Superior Court

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PUGLIA, P. J.

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