Twain Harte Homeowners Assn. v. Patterson

Opinion

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

Appellant Twain Harte Homeowners Association (Association) appeals from an order of dismissal entered after respondents’ demurrer to the Association’s complaint was sustained as to both counts.

The complaint alleges that the Association, the only named plaintiff, is a California corporation organized to represent the interests of its members, all of whom hold title to property within the Twain Harte tract.

In 1948, a recreational easement was recorded on land presently owned by respondents. The easement was granted by respondents’ predecessors in interest “to present and future record title owners of real property situated within the territorial limits of Twain Harte Tract in Tuolumne County.”

The Association alleges that, in a prior action, respondents obtained an “Order Quieting Title to Real Property” without properly giving the notice required by statute, and that respondents “have no right, title, estate, lien, or interest whatsoever in the above-described property superior to that of [the Association’s] members in a recreational easement.”

The complaint asserts two causes of action: one to quiet title, and one for declaratory relief regarding the respective rights of the parties.

Discussion

The only issue is whether the Association has standing to represent the interests of its members in this suit. The Association is not a “record

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title owner” of real property involved in the suit; only its members own such title.

The Association argues this action is permitted under the rationale of

Salton City etc. Owners Assn.

v.

M. Penn Phillips Co.

(1977) 75 Cal.App.3d 184 [141 Cal.Rptr. 895] (hereafter

Salton City).

In that case, plaintiff association, as representative of its members, sued defendant Phillips for fraud in a land sale operation. Phillips demurred on the ground that the association had no standing to sue. The demurrer was sustained; the association failed to amend its complaint, and appealed from a subsequent order of dismissal. The appellate court reversed, finding the essential nature of the lawsuit to be “a class action on behalf of a self-defined class. (Cf.