Fitch v. Justice Court

Opinion

THE COURT.

Samuel Ernest Fitch, the appellant herein, was convicted of drunk driving by the Justice Court of Anderson Judicial District, County of Mendocino, on two occasions within seven years, the first conviction being on July 19, 1968, and the second on October 27, 1969. Upon receipt of court abstracts of those convictions, the Department of Motor Vehicles issued an order suspending his driver’s license for one year, pursuant to the provisions of Vehicle Code, section 13352, subdivision (c).

On March 4, 1970, the appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Superior Court of Mendocino County, naming the justice court and the Department of Motor Vehicles as respondents. By this petition the appellants sought a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the justice court to¡ vacate and set aside the aforementioned convictions, and commanding the Department of Motor Vehicles “to set aside and revoke its order of suspension, upon the setting aside and revoking” of the convictions in the justice court. The petition was denied and we now have before us an appeal from that order.

The relief sought in the petition was based upon an allegation that appellant had not been advised of, and had not knowingly and expressly waived his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to a trial by jury, his right to confront his accusers, and his right to be advised of the nature of the charges and consequences of a guilty plea, in accordance with the requirements of

Boykin

v.

Alabama,

395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709] and

In re Tahl,

1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]. In an order denying the petition the court stated that it had no doubt that the

Boykin

and

Tahl

standards applied to felonies, but it did not believe they applied to misdemeanors and situations such as presented in this case.

On this appeal the only conviction challenged by appellant is the one on October 27, 1969 in which he entered a plea of guilty to misdemeanor