In Re Marriage of House

Opinion

WIENER, J.

Mortiner Edward House appeals the interlocutory judgment dissolving his six-and-one-rhalf year marriage to Ruth Lee House. He challenges both the amount and term of spousal support and ques

[437]

tions the division of community property. We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion on the issue of spousal support and the property division is supported by substantial evidence. We affirm the judgment.

Spousal Support

At the time of trial Ruth was 57 years old and unemployed. The court awarded her $300 per month to be reduced by $1 for every $2 earned by her over $250 per month. She was ordered to furnish an accounting of her earnings to her former husband every 90 days and copies of her W-2 forms each year. The order did not provide for a termination date.

“Although not unlimited, a trial court’s discretion is broad in setting the amount of spousal support to be awarded upon dissolution of marriage.”

(In re Marriage of Morrison

(1978) 20 Cal.3d 437, 454 [143 Cal.Rptr. 139, 573 P.2d 41].) Factors which must be considered in determining the amount and duration of spousal support include: (1) duration of the marriage, (2) the value of community property after division available for support, (3) the party’s accustomed standard of living, and (4) the ability of the supported spouse to engage in gainful employment with appropriate regard to the health and aid to the supported spouse.

(Id.,

at pp. 454-455; Civ. Code, § 4801, subd. (a).)

Here Mortimer had net monthly income of approximately $1,000. His wife was untrained having only worked as a waitress before their marriage. In light of her reasonable and necessary monthly expenses the amount of spousal support was well within the court’s discretion.

On a number of occasions trial courts have been cautioned not to burn their bridges by failing to retain jurisdiction over spousal support. (See e.g.