Inouye v. Pacific Southwest Airlines

Opinion

BROWN (Gerald), P. J.

Robert Oshiro was killed when a Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) jet crashed in San Diego. Ruby Inouye, the

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administratrix of Oshiro’s estate sued PSA for wrongful death on behalf of his heirs. The case was tried before a jury on the issue of damages only.

Inouye Contends the court erred in excluding evidence of Oshiro’s earning capacity. However, the court did not exclude this evidence. When PSA objected to its introduction, Inouye withdrew it. The court committed no error.

Inouye contends the court prejudicially erred in giving the following instruction when the jury was unable to reach a verdict: “It is eminently desirable that if you reasonably can, you agree upon a verdict. For the parties involved, the case is an important one, and its presentation to you has involved expense to both sides. If you fail to agree upon a verdict, the case will have to be tried before another jury selected in the same manner and from the same source as you were chosen. There is no reason to believe that the case will ever be submitted to a jury more competent to decide it. Of course, by pointing out to you the desirability of your reaching a verdict, the Court is not suggesting to any of you that you surrender conscious convictions of what the truth is and of the weight and effect of all the evidence. It does, however, wish to call to your attention that in most cases absolute certainty cannot be expected, and that while each of you must decide the case for yourself and not merely acquiesce in the conclusion of your fellow jurors, you should examine the questions submitted to you with candor and frankness and with proper deference to a regard for the opinion of others.

“While undoubtedly the verdict of the jury should represent the opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury room. The very object of the jury system is to secure decisions by a comparison of views and by arguments among the jurors themselves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not listen with deference to the arguments arid with a distrust of that juror’s own judgment if that juror finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case. It cannot be that each juror should go to the jury room with a blind determination that the verdict shall represent that juror’s opinion of the case at that moment or that that juror should not listen to the arguments of others who are equally honest and intelligent as that juror.