Beckley v. Kenneth W.

Opinion

AGEE, J.

The within minor appeals from an order of the juvenile court adjudging him to be a ward thereof under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, in that he had committed an armed robbery. (Pen. Code, § 211.)

[1122]

Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that his guilt had been adjudged by the “preponderance of evidence” standard, as in civil cases, instead of the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, as in criminal cases.

The former was the proper standard prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court on March 31, 1970 in

In re Winship,

397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068],

1

wherein it was held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a requisite to due process at the adjudicatory stage of a state juvenile court proceeding.

Winship

applies to cases pending on direct appeal from the order or judgment therein.

(In re Steven C.

(1970) 9 Cal.App.3d 255, 262 [88 Cal.Rptr. 97];

In re Joseph G.

(1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 695, 705 [87 Cal.Rptr. 25].)

The juvenile court herein clearly indicated when announcing its decision that it was applying the “preponderance of evidence” standard, stating that “It [the petition] may not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile court, and this is simply the same proof as required in a civil case which is just within the scales and I think the people have produced sufficient testimony to warrant this court in sustaining the petition.”

The failure of the court to apply the proper standard cannot be said to be error which is harmless, since it is evident that the decision might have gone the other way if the court had required that the allegations of the petition be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.