Ramos v. City of Santa Clara
Before: Brown (h.C.)
Opinion
BROWN (H. C.), J.
Respondent City of Santa Clara (hereinafter City) was granted a summary judgment in its favor on the ground that appellant’s
[95]
claims against the City pursuant to a construction contract were barred by a provision of the contract to the effect that acceptance of final payment under the contract released all claims. It is undisputed that such a contract provision existed and that appellant had accepted and negotiated the check for final payment, It is concluded that the complaint and documents raised no question of fact to be resolved by a trial and that summary judgment was properly granted.
Two issues are presented on this appeal. (1) Was the City precluded from asserting the defense of release or accord and satisfaction by failing to plead the defenses? (2) Was the motion for summary judgment properly granted on the ground that appellant’s acceptance of the final payment operated as a release?
Appellant is a contractor and performed work for the City under a calling for installment payments and specifically providing as follows: “26. Acceptance of Final Payment Constitutes Release. The acceptance by the Contractor of final payment shall be and shall operate as a release to the Owner of all claims and all liability to the Contractor for all things done or furnished in connection with this work and for every act and neglect to the owner and others relating to or arising out of this work. No payment, however, final or otherwise, shall operate to release the Contractor or his sureties from any obligations under this contract or the Performance and Payment Bond.”
The total cost of the project was $406,360 of which 10 percent or $40,636 was withheld for final payment. On a form filled out in connection with the final payment, appellant wrote at the bottom, “exception of trench bottom and some extras.” The final payment of $40,636 was paid to appellant by warrant dated August 25, 1970, which warrant was negotiated by appellant.
Appellant initially points out that the affirmative defenses of accord and satisfaction and release must be specially pleaded in order to raise them as issues. (See
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