San Diego County Department of Social Services v. Torres

Opinion

WIENER, J.

Noe Torres appeals from the judgment and order reestablishing his conservatorship after a jury found he was gravely disabled within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 5350, subdivision (d).

1

We affirm.

Public conservator Richard J. Thomson filed a petition on August 23, 1984, seeking to reestablish a conservatorship for Torres on the ground Torres was gravely disabled. Torres requested a jury trial.

Dr. Jon Berlin, a psychiatrist, testified Torres suffered from schizophrenic and intermittent explosive disorder. He said these mental disorders causes Torres to be unable to provide for his basic needs—food, clothing and shelter. Berlin’s testimony was based on a review of hospital charts, the records from previous treating physicians and other staff members who had personal contact with Torres.

[1162]

Nurse’s aide Dennis Browning testified he observed Torres. When Browning would arrive in the morning Torres would either be without clothes or with very dirty clothes. Torres had a hard time interacting properly with his peers; a difficult time making friends; and needed a good deal of care. Without provocation Torres would become angry and explode, losing all control, biting, kicking, scratching and name calling. About once a month he would have a two- or three-day bad period. On two occasions he bit the fingers of staff members, one time biting clear through to the bone. Sometimes he needed to be restrained for his own protection as well as the protection of the staff.

Based on the foregoing evidence the jury found Torres was unable to provide for his basic needs of food, clothing and shelter. The court placed him at Patton State Hospital and reappointed Thomson as conservator.

Discussion

I

Torres argues the court prejudicially erred in admitting Berlin’s opinion testimony that he was unable to provide food, clothing and shelter for himself. Torres’ challenge to this evidence is based on an amalgam of the following: the psychiatrist’s use of hearsay evidence permitted otherwise inadmissible evidence to be received and expertise was unnecessary on the issue of his inability to take care of himself; he also says portions of the psychiatrist’s testimony became unnecessary, thus prejudicial, denying him a fair trial because he admitted he suffered from a mental disorder. Torres admits here that Browning’s testimony is substantial evidence to support the finding that he is unable to take care of his basic needs. None of these arguments has merit.