People v. Superior Court (Woodfin)

California Court of Appeal Mar 22, 1982 No. Civ. 21027Published

Before: Regan

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Holding. A juvenile court cannot maintain jurisdiction over a minor for some offenses while referring others to the adult criminal justice system; once a minor is found unfit for juvenile treatment for any charges, the court must relinquish jurisdiction over the entire individual.

Issues

Whether a juvenile court may retain jurisdiction over a minor for certain offenses after finding the minor unfit for juvenile treatment regarding other offenses.
Whether a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to challenge a juvenile court's refusal to modify previous fitness findings.

Disposition. granted

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“Either the juvenile court or the adult criminal court must deal with the whole individual.”

“We hold, in view of Dennis J., that the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it refused at petitioner’s request under Welfare and Institutions Code section 775 to set aside its previous findings of “fitness””

Opinion

REGAN, J.

The People petition this court for a peremptory writ of mandate directing respondent superior court to vacate its findings that real party in interest was to be dealt with in the juvenile court on various felony charges. We shall grant the petition and shall order real party in interest to be tried as an adult.

Facts

The following procedural facts constitute the corpus of this case:

1. On January 23, 1981, a petition was filed in the Sacramento County Superior Court, sitting as a juvenile court, alleging that real party in interest, Lyndon Fitzgerald Woodfin, age 16, who was already a ward of the court, came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he had committed the following Penal Code offenses: in counts I, II, III, and V, robbery in violation of section 211 and an armed allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a); in count IV, burglary in violation of section 459 and an armed allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a); and in count VI, burglary in violation of section 459 and a use allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b).

2. On February 17, 1981, another petition was filed, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 charging real party with the following Penal Code section violations: in count I, robbery in violation of section 211 and a use allegation within the meaning of section 12022.5; and, in count II, burglary in violation of section 459 and a use allegation within the meaning of section 12022.5.

[973]

3. On February 18, 1981, a fitness hearing pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 707 was held and, despite the presumption of unfitness and findings by the court of past failures at rehabilitation, real party was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt with in the juvenile court. At the same hearing, counts V and VI of the January 23, 1981, petition were dismissed on motion of the People.

4. On March 19, 1981, a third petition was filed, charging real party with the following Penal Code violations: in count I, burglary in violation of section 459, a use allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b), and an armed allegation, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a); in counts II and III, robbery in violation of section 211, a use allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b), and an armed allegation within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (a); in count IV, assault with a deadly weapon and by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a); and in count V, rape in violation of section 261, subdivisions (2) and (3).

People v. Superior Court (Woodfin)

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REGAN, J.

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