In Re Pearlmutter

Opinion

HASTINGS, J.

The within petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by Jacqueline Pearlmutter on behalf of her husband, Jack Pearlmutter, to secure his release from county jail following his 30-day commitment for contempt of court. We ordered Pearlmutter released on $500 bail and calendared the matter for hearing on January 28, 1976. On that date the court was informed that Pearlmutter was in Yuma, Arizona where he was undergoing psychiatric treatment.

The threshold question before us is whether Pearlmutter’s absence from the jurisdiction at the time of the hearing on the habeas corpus petition precludes our ruling on the merits of the petition. We find that it does not. When a prisoner is admitted to bail pursuant to section 1476 of the Penal Code, the officer who had custody of the

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prisoner prior to his release is excused from the requirement of producing his body in court.

(Matter of Murphy,

154 Cal. 168 [97 P. 188].) The prisoner who is at large on bail may attend the hearing on the writ petition if he desires, but his attendance is not necessary to confer jurisdiction on the court. For jurisdictional purposes his undertaking or cash deposit is a substitute for his- personal appearance.

(Matter of Murphy, supra.)

Nor does the fact that Pearlmutter is at large render moot the question of the validity of his original commitment. We therefore proceed to the merits of the present petition.

The contempt citation arose out of a finding that Pearlmutter violated a restraining order issued July 20, 1973, in on-going litigation stemming from divorce action No. D 658430 between Pearlmutter and his former wife Sonia Pearlmutter. The restraining order specified that Pearlmutter and his agents be restrained from “annoying, harassing, molesting” Sonia, Dennis Pearlmutter, who is the son of Jack and Sonia, Karen Pearlmutter, Dennis’ wife, their two sons, and two other enumerated family members. The order further specified that Pearlmutter and his agents be restrained from interfering in any manner with Dennis’ law practice, “including but not limited to contacting any of his clients for any purpose whatsoever.” The order was mutual; it was stipulated to apply to Sonia and Dennis as well as to Pearlmutter and his agents. Counsel for Sonia, seeking clarification of the extent of the order, stated: “. . . we would like it to be known that, in no way, does this stipulation for mutual restraining order—in no way does this prevent the institution of any criminal proceedings or civil proceedings against either of the parties here, the annoyance and harassment referred to by the Court—.” To which the court responded: “.. . I have never heard of any restraining order that restrained anyone from annoying or harassing or molesting the other one that precluded anyone from initiating a legal proceeding unless there was some specific reference.”