People v. Scola

California Court of Appeal Mar 17, 1976 No. Crim. 14370Published

Before: Brown (h.C.)

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Holding. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for vehicular manslaughter because the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's excessive speed was a proximate cause of the collision. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in refusing requested instructions that were merely repetitious of those already provided.

Issues

Whether the evidence was sufficient to prove that the defendant's excessive speed was a proximate cause of the fatal collision.
Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give the defendant's requested jury instructions.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The jury in the instant case could draw the reasonable inference from the evidence that the proximate cause of the accident was the excessive speed of appellant’s vehicle.”

“Since repetitious instructions need not be given, the court correctly refused to give appellant’s requested instructions.”

Opinion

BROWN (H. C.), J.

This is an appeal from a conviction of vehicular manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (3)(b)), arising out óf a collision between a Camaro automobile driven by appellant, Paul A. Scola, and a Pontiac automobile driven by the deceased, Bonnie Lynn Schendel.

Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient and that the court erred in its refusal to give certain requested instructions. We disagree with both contentions and affirm the judgment.

In early evening on July 3, 1974, appellant was traveling north on Sonoma Boulevard, a four-lane thoroughfare, with a posted speed limit of 45 miles per hour. Decedent was traveling west on Magazine Street, a narrow, two-lane street, and was required by a stop sign to stop at the intersection where the collision occurred.

A woman who was also stopped at the intersection but on the other side, observed appellant coming down Sonoma, estimated his speed at 60 miles per hour and was of the opinion that he was in the curb lane. Another witness also noticed appellant before he reached the intersection and believed that he was in the fast lane, proceeding at a rapid but unspecified speed. A third witness observed Mrs. Schendel stop at the intersection and look both ways. Before she could proceed, three cars from behind her maneuvered through a Texaco station at the intersection and passed her. Afterwards, she started to move through the intersection. As she did so, appellant crashed into her car, crushed in its side, and pushed it sideways up the boulevard for a considerable distance.

Police, arriving at the scene of the accident, measured skid marks which they testified were left by appellant’s automobile, curving from the curb lane toward the area of impact and from the area of impact to the final resting place of the car. These were measured as 96 feet from start of marks to point of impact and 90 feet from impact area to final

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stopping place. The point of impact was 30 feet west of the east curb lane of Sonoma Boulevard or in the fast lane. Based upon the combined distance of the skid marks, coupled with additional road surface tests, a Highway Patrol officer trained in skid mark analysis calculated speed to be 78.8 miles per hour before he applied his brakes.

People v. Scola

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BROWN (H. C.), J.

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