Sprowl v. Superior Court

[779]

Opinion

STEIN, J.

Petitioner, granted a trial preference pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 36, subdivision (a),

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seeks to compel respondent to set an immediate date for her trial. (§ 36, subd. (f).) As will be seen, we grant the requested relief.

The history of the case is not in dispute.

Petitioner is the plaintiff in a suit against various asbestos manufacturers. Her motion for trial preference (§ 36, subd. (a)) was granted on June 13, 1988. A trial date was set for September 6, 1988; however, no courtroom was available; a second trial date of October 24, 1988, was set. While that date was beyond the 120 days specified by section 36, subdivision (f), for the setting of a trial with preference, or the 15 days for continuance, petitioner acquiesced without waiving her right, apparently attempting to cooperate with respondent superior court’s efforts to accommodate its extensive criminal case load and its equally heavy backlog of asbestos personal injury cases. Similar continuances occurred thereafter, with trial dates of January 30, 1989, April 10, 1989, August 14, 1989, and October 2, 1989, being vacated.

In most instances, petitioner was notified by mail that the court had no trial departments available. In October of 1989, however, petitioner’s attorney appeared, but an asbestos personal injury action with no trial preference was assigned to a courtroom—instead of petitioner’s case or others for whom preference had been granted—apparently because it was anticipated to last only a few days.

On October 2, 1989, a new date of February 5, 1990, was set. When petitioner was given notice by respondent that that date, too, was vacated, she immediately filed a motion for reconsideration. In that motion, she objected to further continuance and requested a trial date in accordance

[780]