Watamura v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.
Before: Ashby
Opinion
ASHBY, Acting P. J.
Plaintiff and appellant Ronald Watamura was insured under a homeowner’s insurance policy with defendant and respondent State Farm Fire and Casualty Company. Respondent denied a property loss claim under the policy, and appellant brought this action for a breach of contract and bad faith, We hold the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of respondent on the ground that the loss was excluded by clear and unambiguous terms of the policy, and appellant raised no triable issues of material fact. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c.)
[371]
Appellant’s “sandrail vehicle” was stolen from appellant’s premises. It is undisputed that the sandrail vehicle is a motor-propelled vehicle designed for movement on land, primarily on sand dunes.
The “Coverage B—personal Property” section of the homeowner’s policy expressly provides: “Property Not Covered. We do not cover: . . . (3) any engine or motor propelled vehicle or machine, including the parts, designed for movement on land. We do cover those used solely for the service of the insured location and not licensed for use on public highways.”
There was no ambiguity in this provision. The sandrail was an engine or motor-propelled vehicle designed for movement on land, and was therefore excluded. It did not fall within the exception for vehicles “used solely for the service of the insured location” such as a tractor-mower.
When the terms of an insurance policy are plain and explicit, the court will not indulge in forced or strained construction to impose liability.
(Roug
v.
Ohio Security Ins. Co.
(1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1030, 1038 [227 Cal.Rptr. 751].)
Appellant strains to create an ambiguity by referring to a different portion of the policy which is not relevant. Appellant relies on a provision in the definition section which states “motor vehicle” means “a motorized land vehicle designed for travel on public roads or subject to motor vehicle registration. A motorized land vehicle in dead storage on an insured location is not a motor vehicle.” Appellant argues there is a triable issue of fact as to whether his sandrail vehicle was in dead storage at the time of the theft, and that the above definition of “motor vehicle” renders the exclusion clause of the policy ambiguous.
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