KADISON, PHAELZER, WOODARD, QUINN & ROSSI v. Wilson

Opinion

SONENSHINE, J.

In this appeal we are asked to decide whether trust property is exempt from prejudgment attachment pursuant to Code of Civil

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Procedure section 483.010.

1

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude it is not.

I

Appellants Thomas Wilson and Marilyn Grandon are cotrustees of the testamentary trust of the estate of Huber Greer Wilson, their father. The principal asset of the trust is a parcel of real property located in Santa Ana, California valued at $10 million with a market rental value of $30,000 per month. The trustees retained Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi (Kadison) to represent them in three separate actions involving the trust property.

2

Wilson advised Kadison, at the time the firm was retained, payment of fees and court costs would be made from the trust estate. But the trustees refused to pay the accruing legal fees. After Kadison incurred $24,699.26 in costs and $234,734.54 in fees, it filed the underlying lawsuit seeking payment and prejudgment attachment. The trustees opposed the application for attachment, asserting section 483.010, subdivision (c) precludes attachment of trust property. The superior court disagreed and issued a writ of attachment against the trust property.

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II

Section 483.010, subdivision (c) prohibits a prejudgment attachment against a defendant who is a natural person unless the claim arises out of a trade, business, or profession, Wilson contends the trustees are natural persons and therefore not subject to prejudgment attachment because the claim did not arise out of a trade or business. We agree that Wilson and Grandon, acting as trustees, are natural persons. However, the Wilson trust is not. (3 Scott, Trusts (3d ed. 1967) §§ 2.2-3.1, pp. 37-45; 3 Scott,