Johnson v. Alexis

California Court of Appeal May 18, 1983 No. Civ. 26320Published

Before: Cologne

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Holding. The court held that amendments to Vehicle Code section 13352, which base driver's license suspensions on the date of offenses rather than convictions, cannot be applied retroactively to an offense committed before the statute's effective date. Because the legislature did not clearly express an intent for retroactive application, the statute must be given only prospective effect.

Issues

Whether the application of amended Vehicle Code section 13352 to a second drunk driving offense occurring before the statute's effective date constitutes an impermissible retroactive application of the law.

Disposition. affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“a statute should not be given retroactive effect so as to deprive an individual of a pre-existing right unless the Legislature has clearly expressed its intention to accomplish that end”

“Under the settled rule, we must give the amendments to section 13352 only prospective operation and effect. The amendments simply do not apply to Johnson’s case.”

Opinion

COLOGNE, Acting P. J.

The Director of the State Department of Motor Vehicles, Doris V. Alexis, appeals after the trial court granted Duane Doyle

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Johnson’s petition for mandate and ordered the director to set aside an order suspending Johnson’s driver’s license.

On October 29, 1975, Johnson drove a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. He was convicted of that offense January 20, 1976. Four years, 359 days after the first offense, on October 23, 1980, Johnson repeated the crime. He was convicted of the repeat offense on March 16, 1981.

On January 1,1981, amendments to Vehicle Code

section 13352 became effective, changing the rule requiring a one-year suspension of one’s driver’s license upon a second

conviction

of the drunk driving offense within five years to a rule requiring the suspension upon a second conviction of a drunk driving “offense which occurred within five years of the date of a prior offense which resulted in a conviction.”

Thus, two offenses, rather than two convictions, within five years became the basis for suspension on January 1, 1981.

On May 21, 1981, the director ordered Johnson’s license suspended, applying the law that went into effect January 1, 1981.

Johnson brought his writ on the theory the director’s application of the new law to his case constituted application of an ex post facto law. The trial court agreed with Johnson’s theory, labeling the change of law an ex post facto provision and a bill of attainder as to Johnson.

Under settled principles of jurisprudence, it is unnecessary to deal with the constitutional ex post facto-bifi of attainder issues (U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl.

[85]

Johnson v. Alexis

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