In Re JGL

43 Cal.App.3d 447 (1974) 117 Cal. Rptr. 799 In re J.G.L. III et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

PHILLIP L. WESSON, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Defendant and Respondent.

Docket No. 13766. Court of Appeals of California, Fourth District, Division Two.

November 25, 1974. [448] COUNSEL

Phillip L. Wesson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Adrian Kuyper, County Counsel, and Edward N. Duran, Deputy County Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

GARDNER, P.J.

Mrs. L., an indigent, is the mother of two children on whose behalf a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 600 was filed. Mrs. L. refused the services of all deputies in the public defender's office assigned to the juvenile court. The court then appointed [449] Mr. Wesson to represent her but did not commit the court as to payment of any attorney's fees in view of the lack of a conflict. Nevertheless, Mr. Wesson proceeded to represent Mrs. L. and thereafter petitioned the court for fees. His petition was denied and he appeals.

In order to bring this matter into proper focus, some background as to the Juvenile Court Law and the law respecting the appointment of the public defender to represent indigent litigants is necessary. Each has had a checkered career but to avoid an interminable law review article format, this background will be discussed in very general terms.

Prior to 1961, the California Juvenile Court Law was "pure" juvenile court law embracing wholeheartedly the parens patriae philosophy with an almost complete disregard of the constitutional rights of those who appeared in that court. Enacted originally in 1903, it was a hodge-podge of amendments and amendments to amendments. Thus in 1957, the Governor appointed a commission to survey and evaluate the administration of juvenile justice in this state. In 1960, that commission reported its recommendations which were adopted almost in their entirety by the Legislature in the Juvenile Court Law of 1961. Under that law certain constitutional rights of the parties in the juvenile court were recognized. Insofar as the right to counsel was concerned, an effort to reconcile the parens patriae philosophy of the juvenile court with full recognition of the constitutional right to counsel of those appearing in that court resulted in a somewhat hybrid procedure which is now of interest only to legal historians. However, under the impetus of Kent v. United States (1966) 383 U.S. 541 [16 L.Ed.2d 84, 86 S.Ct. 1045], and In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 87 S.Ct. 1428], the 1961 law was amended from time to time until at present the right to counsel is covered by two sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code sections 634 and 517.