People v. Freddie R.

Opinion

LILLIE, Acting P. J.

The minor appeals from order of the juvenile court sustaining petition charging assault with a deadly weapon upon one

[831]

Lindley arising out of a motor vehicle accident in which neither Lindley nor the minor was involved, and committing him to the California Youth Authority. Timely application for rehearing was filed by the minor on November 29, 1978. On December 19, 1978, the court issued the following order, “Good cause appearing, the court orders the time extended for ruling on the rehearing to the 45th day (January 12, 1979).” On January 9, 1979, the application was denied.

The sole issue is whether the juvenile court must articulate its reasons for the “good cause” recited in its order extending time under section 252, Welfare and Institutions Code.

1

The statute in pertinent part provides: “If an application for rehearing is not granted within 20 days following the date of its receipt, it shall be deemed denied. However, the court, for good cause, may extend such period beyond 20 days, but not in any event beyond 45 days, following the date of receipt of the application . . . :” (See

In re Edgar M.,

14 Cal.3d 727, 737 [122 Cal.Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406], holding that an application not acted upon within 20 days is deemed to have been granted.)

In re Danny T., 22

Cal.3d 918 [150 Cal.Rptr. 916, 587 P.2d 712] controls our disposition of this case. Although the Supreme Court in

Danny T.

was not directly confronted with the issue before us, the context in which its language appears makes it clear that stated reasons must be given by the juvenile court for its conclusion that good cause exists to extend time under section 252. Such requirement of articulated reasons to support a given decision is consistent with the Legislature’s intent and the meaning of section 252 expressed in

Danny T.

(p. 921); acts as an inherent guard against the careless decision and routine extensions; insures that the judge engages in a careful and reasoned decision-making process; and is essential to any meaningful appellate review of the decision.