Aguilar v. Municipal Court

Opinion

POCHÉ, J.

Michael David Aguilar appeals from a judgment of the Santa Clara County Superior Court which summarily denied his petition for writ of prohibition. We reverse.

Facts

Aguilar was cited on two occasions for violating Los Gatos Town Code, chapter 16, article X, section 16-105, which prohibits “cruising” in the city’s central business district. The ordinance defines “cruising” as “driving a motor vehicle on a highway (1) for the sake of driving, without immediate destination, (2) at random, but on the lookout for possible developments, or (3) for the purposes of (a) sightseeing repeatedly in the same area, and (b) while driving with the purpose of socializing with other motorists or pedestrians.” (Los Gatos Town Code, § 16-100, subd. (b).)

Appellant demurred to the citations on the grounds that: (1) respondent, the Municipal Court for the Los Gatos-Campbell-Saratoga Judicial District, had no jurisdiction to proceed on the charged offenses because section 16-105 of the Los Gatos Town Code was unconstitutional on its face, and because this area of legislation was preempted by the Vehicle Code; and (2) the facts alleged did not constitute a public offense because the activity was protected by the 1st, 4th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution, and by article I, sections 2, 7, and 13 of the California Constitution. The demurrer was overruled. Appellant then filed a petition for a writ of prohibition in the Santa Clara County Superior Court in which he sought to restrain the respondent municipal court from proceeding upon the criminal citations. This appeal followed the summary denial of that petition.

[37]

Discussion

Vehicle Code section 21

1

provides that “no local authority shall enact or enforce any ordinance on the matters covered by this code unless expressly authorized herein.” The Town of Los Gatos

2

contends the cruising ordinance is not preempted by the Vehicle Code because it does not regulate a matter covered by the code. To the contrary, the ordinance does fall within “matters covered by this code”—motor vehicle traffic control—a field which has been preempted by the state since 1935.