LINCOLNSHIRE CONDOMINIUM, LTD. v. Superior Court

Opinion

BUTLER, J.

There was a discovery dispute and the parties agreed to extend the 30 days for bringing a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (a)). Notwithstanding their stipulation, the court denied the motion to compel saying it lacked jurisdiction because the motion was made more than 30 days after the service of the answers. Petitioner brought a motion for reconsideration, in order to document the agreement, which was denied.

The question here is one of jurisdiction. Does the 30-day limit for bringing the motion to compel confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court which cannot be modified by the court nor waived by the parties? The answer is found in the statute itself, which states in part: “If the party who has submitted the interrogatories deems that further response is required, he may move the court for an order requiring further response. Such motion must be upon notice given within 30 days from date of service of the answers or objections

unless the court, on motion and notice, and for good cause shown, enlarges the time.”

(Code Civ. Proc., § 2030, subd. (a),

1

italics added.)

[526]

If the court has the power to enlarge the time, then the 30-day limit does not regulate the power of the court to act. Such a time limit may be extended by written stipulation of the parties.

The trial judge purportedly relied on

Vidal Sassoon, Inc.

v.

Superior Court

(1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 681 [195 Cal.Rptr. 295] in coming to the opposite conclusion. But

Vidal Sassoon

does not deal with jurisdiction in the sense of subject matter jurisdiction which cannot be conferred by the court or the parties. All it says is that bringing the motion within 30 days is mandatory unless the time has been extended. In making this statement, the court in