People v. Feagley

California Court of Appeal Jun 12, 1974 No. Crim. 12323Published

Before: Draper

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Holding. The court held that a trial court may impose probation on a mentally disordered sex offender despite the fact that prior hospital confinement credits bar future incarceration, but the term of probation cannot exceed the statutory maximum of three years for a misdemeanor.

Issues

Whether a court has the power to impose probation when prior hospital confinement credits preclude future incarceration for the underlying offense.
Whether the five-year minimum probation period for mentally disordered sex offenders overrides the three-year statutory maximum for misdemeanor offenses.

Disposition. reversed and remanded

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“We conclude that the trial court has power to prescribe probation with the foregoing limitation of sanctions.”

“Hence we hold that the maximum period of probation which may be imposed upon appellant is that provided by section 1203a—three years.”

Opinion

DRAPER, P. J.

Appellant is described in a probation report as a “rather pathetic, guarded, defensive man who has an obsessional ritualistic pattern of snipping hair” from the heads of young girls. The report shows a num

[774]

ber of prior convictions for offenses stemming from his hair fetishism. He was charged in this case with two counts of child molesting (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (a)), and pleaded guilty to one count of misdemeanor battery (Pen. Code, § 242), agreed to be a lesser included offense. Appellant was found to be a mentally disordered sex offender and was committed to the department of mental hygiene. After some 1,000 days of such hospitalization, he was returned to the court as one who would not benefit from further treatment but was not a menace to the health and safety of others. The criminal proceeding was resumed, imposition of sentence was suspended and he was admitted to probation for five years, upon condition that he refrain from use of intoxicating liquor, from association with any minor under the age of 18, and participate in a treatment program recommended by the probation officer. Treating the order admitting him to probation as a judgment (Pen. Code, § 1237), Feagley appeals.

The issue is whether the court had power to impose probation upon appellant on a criminal charge under these circumstances. By statute, “the time . . . spent under indeterminate commitment as a mentally disordered sex offender shall be credited in fixing his term of sentence.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6325.) But the maximum penalty for battery, the crime of which appellant stands convicted, is imprisonment in the county jail for six months, a fine of $1,000, or both (Pen. Code, § 243).

It is apparent that if appellant had been sentenced to the maximum six months’ jail term, with execution of that sentence suspended, the order would be void because the credit against the sentence was far more than its duration.

(People

Berry,

257 Cal.App.2d 731, 738-739 [65 Cal.Rptr. 125].)

People v. Feagley

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DRAPER, P. J.

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