Opinion
ARABIAN, J.* This case comes to us by a circuitous route, having been remanded after the United States Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal and vacated that court’s judgment in favor of defendant City of Culver City. The high court’s order of remand directed the Court of Appeal to reexamine its prior judgment “in light of Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 [129 L.Ed.2d 304, 114 S.Ct. 2309]. . . .” (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1994) 512 U.S. _ [129 L.Ed.2d 854, 114 S.Ct. 2731].)
Following remand, a divided Court of Appeal reaffirmed its earlier ruling in favor of defendant city in an unpublished opinion. We then granted the petition for review by plaintiff, a property owner and developer, to consider important and unsettled questions concerning the extent to which the high court’s opinions in Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 [129 L.Ed.2d 304, 114 S.Ct. 2309] (Dolan) and the earlier case of Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n (1987) 483 U.S. 825 [97 L.Ed.2d 677, 107 S.Ct. 3141] (Nollan) apply to development permits that exact afee as a condition of issuance, rather than, as in both Nollan and Dolan, the possessory dedication of real property.
As we explain, we conclude that the tests formulated by the high court in its Dolan and Nollan opinions for determining whether a compensable regulatory taking has occurred under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution apply, under the circumstances of this case, to the monetary exaction imposed by Culver City as a condition of approving plaintiff’s request that the real property in suit be rezoned to permit the construction of a multi-unit residential condominium. We thus reject the city’s contention that the heightened takings clause standard formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan applies only to cases in which the local land use authority requires the developer to dedicate real property to public use as a condition of permit approval.
[860]We arrive at this conclusion not by reference to the constitutional takings clause alone, but within the statutory framework presented by the Mitigation Fee Act. (Gov. Code, § 66000 et seq.) We will conclude in this case that, in order to avoid substantial questions concerning the constitutional sufficiency of the legislative standard embodied in the act, the tests formulated by the high court in its Dolan and Nollan opinions for determining when a regulatory taking has occurred apply here to the act’s requirement that the local regulatory authority demonstrate a “reasonable relationship” between the monetary exaction and the public impact of the development.
We thus interpret the act’s “reasonable relationship” standard, as applied to the development fee at issue in this case, as embodying the standard of review formulated by j the high court in its Nollan and Dolan opinions —proof by the local permitting authority of both an “essential nexus” or relationship between the permit condition and the public impact of the proposed development, and of a “rough proportionality” between the magnitude of the fiscal exaction and the effects of the proposed development.
Applying this standard in this case, we conclude, first, that the city has met its burden of demonstrating the required connection or nexus between the rezoning—to permit a residential use of a parcel of land zoned for private recreational use—and the imposition of a monetary exaction to be expended in support of recreational purposes as a means of mitigating that loss. We conclude, however, that the record before us is insufficient to sustain the city’s determination that plaintiff pay a so-called mitigation fee of $280,000 as a condition for approval of his request that the property be rezoned to permit the construction of a condominium project. Because the city may be able to justify the imposition of some fee under the recently minted standard of Dolan, we follow the Oregon Supreme Court’s disposition in that case and direct that the cause be remanded to the city for additional proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
I
Factual and Procedural Background
A
Between 1973 and 1975, plaintiff acquired a vacant 2.4-acre lot on Overland Avenue in Culver City and obtained city approval to develop the site as a private tennis club and recreational facility. At plaintiff’s request, the city amended its zoning and general plan ordinances governing uses on the property from a split zone R-l (single-family residential) and C-2 (retail [861]commercial) to C-3 (commercial). A specific plan was also adopted by the city providing for the development of a privately operated tennis club and recreational facility.1 A report prepared by city planning officials in 1974 recommending approval of the development permit recognized that “the need for additional tennis facilities in this city is a real one”; the planning commission resolution recommending approval likewise observed that “[t]he proposed zoning of the property in conjunction with the specific plan will provide a suitably located area within the City for additional tennis club facilities in the form of a private tennis club.” From 1975 to 1988, plaintiff, alone or through others, operated the sports complex—consisting by then of a swimming pool, five tennis courts, racquetball courts, and weight training and aerobic facilities—on the site.
In 1981, in response to financial losses, plaintiff applied to the city for a change in land use in order to construct an office building on the site; that application was abandoned after the city planning commission recommended against approval on the ground that the existing sports and tennis club provided a needed commercial recreational facility within the city. The club continued in operation under a series of managers until August 1988, when plaintiff closed it as a result of continuing financial losses. The following month, he again applied to the city for an amendment to the general plan, a zoning change and amendment of the specific plan to allow construction of a 30-unit condominium complex valued at $10 million.
Shortly after the submission of plaintiff’s application, the city expressed an interest in acquiring the property for operation as a municipally owned sports facility and hired outside consultants to study the feasibility of the acquisition. The impetus behind the city’s interest was a perceived deficiency in existing municipal recreational facilities. Buying the property, according to a city council staff report, offered the “opportunity to preserve an existing sports/recreational facility for public use and relieve pressure on existing facilities.” The feasibility study concluded that, by national standards, the city was two to four tennis courts short, and deficient in the number of its public swimming pools and gymnasiums. The study also concluded that plaintiff’s club had encountered financial problems through a combination of management problems, poor maintenance, and a lack of competitive amenities offered by other clubs. Without extensive capital improvements, the study concluded, the club could not “compete financially in today’s health and fitness market.”
Based upon the findings of the study, the city concluded that it lacked the funds to purchase and operate the club as a general public sports complex, [862]and would incur substantial financial risks if it purchased and operated the club on a limited membership, fee-for-service basis. In April 1989, the city decided not to purchase the property. At the same time, the city council disapproved plaintiff’s application based on concerns over the loss of a recreational land use needed by the community. In the meantime, plaintiff obtained a demolition permit and tore down the existing site improvements. The still-useful equipment, including the tennis court lights, nets, and lockers, he donated to the city.
Following the rejection of his application, plaintiff entered into discussions with members of the city council and city staff in an attempt to restructure the project. He asserts that he was informed the project would not be approved unless he agreed to build new recreational facilities for the city. In response, plaintiff apparently raised the possibility of constructing four new municipal tennis courts. During this time period plaintiff filed, but did not serve, a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for damages commencing this lawsuit. Following a closed-door meeting ostensibly to discuss the pending litigation, the city council voted to approve plaintiff’s application conditioned upon the payment of certain monetary exactions. In lieu of the construction of four tennis courts as a condition of approval, the city required the payment of $280,000 “to be used” as stated in the ratifying ordinance, “for additional [public] recreational facilities as directed by the City Council.” The minutes of the city council meeting state that the $280,000 fee was to be used “for partial replacement of the lost recreational facilities . . .” occasioned by the specific plan amendment. The amount of the fee was based upon a city study which showed that the replacement costs for the recreational facilities “lost” as a result of amending the specific plan would be $250,000 to $280,000 for the pool, $135,000 to 150,000 for the paddle tennis courts, and $275,000 to $300,000 for the tennis courts.
In addition to the $280,000 recreation fee, the city also required plaintiff to pay an exaction under the city’s “art in public places” program. By municipal ordinance, new residential development projects of more than four units, as well as all commercial, industrial, and public building projects with a building valuation exceeding $500,000, are required to provide “art work” (as defined by the ordinance) for the project in an amount equal to 1 percent of the total building valuation, or to pay an equal amount in cash to the city art fund. The city valued plaintiff’s project at $3.2 million. He elected initially to pay the fee, which totaled $33,200, but his successor in interest [863]apparently subsequently placed art of his own choosing on the site rather than pay the in-lieu fee.2
Thereafter, plaintiff filed with the city formal written protests to the imposition of the $280,000 recreation fee and the $33,200 art in public places exaction, pursuant to Government Code sections 66020 and 66021. The city rejected both protests. Plaintiff then amended his complaint to allege that imposition of the fees amounted to an unconstitutional taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 19 of the California Constitution.3 The parties later entered into an agreement whereby plaintiff agreed to pay the $280,000 recreation fee under protest in exchange for the necessary building and grading permits for the project. Plaintiff retained the right to proceed with his lawsuit, and agreed that the city would obtain a lien on the property as security for payment of the $280,000 fee. The site was subsequently developed and residential units were sold to the public.
B
The petition for writ of mandate, by which plaintiff sought to set aside the $280,000 recreation fee and the $33,200 in-lieu art fee as unconstitutional takings, was bifurcated from the balance of the complaint. Following a hearing, the trial court invalidated the $280,000 recreation fee, holding that there was “no reasonable relation . . . between the plaintiff’s project and the need for public tennis courts in the City.” The trial court concluded that the exaction was “simply an effort to shift the cost of providing a public benefit to one no more responsible for the need than any other taxpayer.” The trial court declined to set aside the $33,200 art fee, however, ruling that it was not an unconstitutional taking.
The Court of Appeal initially affirmed the judgment in its entirety but on rehearing modified its opinion to reverse that portion of the judgment [864]invalidating the $280,000 recreation fee. (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1737 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 468].) The Court of Appeal found there was a “substantial nexus” (id. at p. 1749) between the proposed condominium project and the $280,000 exaction. “The mitigation fee was imposed to compensate the City for the benefit conferred on the developer by the City’s approval of the townhome project and for the burden to the community resulting from the loss of recreational facilities.” (Id. at p. 1750.) Thus, the recreation fee was not, in the Court of Appeal’s judgment, an unconstitutional taking without just compensation. The Court of Appeal also affirmed that portion of the judgment upholding the in-lieu art fee.
Plaintiff then sought certiorari from the United States Supreme Court. The high court granted his petition, vacated the Court of Appeal judgment, and remanded the case for further consideration in light of its opinion in Dolan. (Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, supra, 512 U.S._[129 L.Ed.2d 854, 114 S.Ct. 2731].) As noted, following remand, a divided Court of Appeal reached the identical result. In addition to its earlier conclusions, it found that the $280,000 fee was “roughly proportional” in nature and extent to the needs generated by the project, and therefore passed muster under Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2319-2320]. We granted plaintiff’s petition for review and now reverse.
II
The Mitigation Fee Act (Gov. Code, § 66000 et seq.)
As noted, this case arises within the statutory framework of the Mitigation Fee Act (the Act), introduced in the Legislature as Assembly Bill No. 1600, 1987-1988 Regular Session, and enacted as Statutes 1987, chapter 927, effective January 1, 1989. The Act, codified as sections 66000-66003 of the Government Code, sets forth procedures for protesting the imposition of fees and other monetary exactions imposed on a development by a local agency. As its legislative history evinces, the Act was passed by the Legislature “in response to concerns among developers that local agencies were imposing development fees for purposes unrelated to development projects.” (Centex Real Estate Corp. v. City of Vallejo (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1358, 1361 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 48]; Sen. Local Gov. Com. analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1600 (1987-1988 Reg. Sess.) p. 1; see also Garrick Development Co. v. Hayward Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 320 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 897].)
Plaintiff complied with the requirements of Government Code section 66020 by filing a protest with the city which enumerated all of the bases of his challenge to the recreational and art fees, including his constitutional [865]takings claim. These claims were subsequently set forth in the complaint and writ petition. In the subsequent agreement between plaintiff and the city, plaintiff agreed to pay the disputed fees and to have a lien recorded against the property, and the city agreed to allow the project to proceed, and further stipulated that “[njothing in this agreement shall in any way waive or restrict [plaintiff’s] rights to pursue the protest [plaintiff] has made under [former] Government Code § 66008 [now section 66020] and by the above-mentioned lawsuit.” Thus, the agreement expressly preserved both the statutory claim under the Act and the takings claims set forth in plaintiff’s statutory protest and in his lawsuit.4
Although for the most part procedural in nature, the Act also embodies a statutory standard against which monetary exactions by local governments subject to its provisions are measured. Government Code section 66001 requires the local agency to determine “how there is a reasonable relationship” between the proposed use of a given exaction and both “the type of development project” and “the need for the public facility and the type of development project on which the fee is imposed.” (Gov. Code, § 66001, subd. (a)(3), (4), italics added.) In addition, the local agency must determine how there is a “reasonable relationship” between “the amount of the fee and the cost of the public facility or portion of the public facility attributable to the development on which the fee is imposed.” (Id., § 66001, subd. (b), italics added.)
The Act thus codifies, as the statutory standard applicable by definition to nonpossessory monetary exactions, the “reasonable relationship” standard employed in California and elsewhere to measure the validity of required dedications of land (or fees imposed in lieu of such dedications) that are challenged under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council of Los Angeles (1949) 34 Cal.2d 31 [207 P.2d 1, 11 A.L.R.2d 503]; Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1971) 4 Cal.3d 633 [94 Cal.Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606, 43 A.L.R.3d 847] (Associated Home Builders); Grupe v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 148 [212 Cal.Rptr. 578]; cf. Notion, supra, 483 U.S at pp. 839-840 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 690-691]; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319] [“Some form of the reasonable relationship test has been adopted in many . . . jurisdictions.”].)
[866]As we explain, the high court’s opinions in Nolían and Dolan cast substantial doubt on the sufficiency of the Associated Home Builders standard, at least as applied to cases such as this one, where the property owner challenges an individualized exaction imposed as a condition of issuance of a development permit as an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment. The high court’s recent takings jurisprudence, as we comprehend it, underlines the separate nature of the takings clause as an independent constitutional guarantee, one that is not only distinct from the commands of the due process and equal protection provisions of the federal Constitution, but which embodies a standard of judicial review that is greater than the “minimal level of scrutiny” mandated by those provisions. (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].)
We do not believe, however, that these conceptual obscurities need cause problems in practice. Although the Act predates the formulation adopted by the high court in Dolan, we believe the Act’s “reasonable relationship” language should be construed in light of Dolan’% “rough proportionality” test for two reasons. First, the statutory scheme authorizes “any party on whom a fee, tax, assessment, dedication, reservation, or other exaction has been imposed, the payment or performance of which is required to obtain governmental approval of a development,” to protest such an imposition by following the procedures provided in section 66020 of the Act. (Gov. Code, § 66021, subd. (a), italics added.) Such a broadly formulated and unqualified authorization is consistent with the view that the Legislature intended to require all protests to a development fee that challenge the sufficiency of its relationship to the effects attributable to a development project—regardless of the legal underpinnings of the protest—to be channeled through the administrative procedures mandated by the Act. Such claims would encompass not only statutory grounds, but contentions that a given imposition offends the commands of the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. Requiring that constitutionally based claims be determined under the provisions of the Act does not itself raise a constitutional issue “‘[i]f the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if resort to that process “yield[s] just compensation,” . . . .’” (Hensler v. City of Glendale (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1, 13 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 244, 876 P.2d 1043], quoting Williamson Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 U.S. 172, 194-195 [87 L.Ed.2d 126, 143-144, 105 S.Ct. 3108].) This is so because the Fifth Amendment “leaves to the state ... the procedures by which compensation may be sought.” (8 Cal.4th at p. 13.)
Second, because the Legislature incorporated into Government Code section 66001, subdivision (a)(3) of the Act a standard that generally corresponds to the one reflected in the high court’s takings jurisprudence (see [867]Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319] [“We think the ‘reasonable relationship’ test adopted by a majority of the state courts is closer to the federal constitutional norm .... [W]e do not adopt it as such, partly because the term . . . seems confusingly similar to the term ‘rational basis’ . . . .”]), it is appropriate for this court to interpret the statutory standard in a manner consistent with the high court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan so that a development fee imposed pursuant to the act, and that satisfies its requirements, will not be subject to challenge on constitutional grounds. By interpreting the “reasonable relationship” standard adopted by Government Code section 66001 as imposing a requirement consistent with the NollanIDolan standard, we serve the legislative purpose of protecting developers from disproportionate and excessive fees, and carry out the legislative intent of imposing a statutory relationship between monetary exaction and development project that accurately reflects the prevailing takings clause standard.5
We must, in other words, recognize that in the wake of Dolan the term “reasonable relationship” embraces both constitutional and statutory meanings which, for all practical purposes, have merged to the extent that the Dolan decision applies to development fees—an issue we address below. Thus, developers who wish to challenge a development fee on either statutory or constitutional grounds must do so via the statutory framework provided by the Act. (Cf. Hensler v. City of Glendale, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 13-15.)
Ill
“Leveraging” the Permit Power and the Takings Clause
Our account of the factual record should make it clear that we view this case as one presenting the earmarks of what has come to be characterized in recent takings jurisprudence as a form of regulatory “leveraging.” We mean to convey by such a characterization what Justice Scalia appears to have had in mind when, describing the California Coastal Commission’s exaction of a beachfront easement from a homeowner as a condition of [868]issuing a development permit, he wrote in Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825, that “One would expect that a [permit] regime in which this kind of leveraging [i.e., the imposition of unrelated exactions as a condition for granting permit approval] of the police power is allowed would produce stringent land-use regulation which the State then waives to accomplish other purposes . . . (Id. at p. 837, fn. 5 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 690], italics added.)
In our view, the intermediate standard of judicial scrutiny formulated by the high court in Nollan and Dolan is intended to address just such indicators in land use “bargains” between property owners and regulatory bodies— those in which the local government conditions permit approval for a given use on the owner’s surrender of benefits which purportedly offset the impact of the proposed development. It is in this paradigmatic permit context— where the individual property owner-developer seeks to negotiate approval of a planned development—that the combined Nollan and Dolan test quintessential^" applies. Its effect, at least as to those conditions that fail to exhibit the constitutionally required nexus, is to rule out the imposition of a certain species of regulatory conditions: those which are either logically unrelated to legitimate regulatory objectives or fail to exhibit the constitutionally required “fit” between conditional means and legitimate governmental ends.
Where the local permit authority seeks to justify a given exaction as an alternative to denying a proposed use, Nollan requires a reviewing court to scrutinize the instrumental efficacy of the permit condition in order to determine whether it logically furthers the same regulatory goal as would outright denial of a development permit. A court must also, under the standard formulated in Dolan, determine whether the factual findings made by the permitting body support the condition as one that is more or less proportional, in both nature and scope, to the public impact of the proposed development.
Thus, although we conclude that the combined test of Nollan and Dolan applies to the monetary exaction imposed by Culver City in this case, we also conclude that the heightened standard of scrutiny is triggered by a relatively narrow class of land use cases—those exhibiting circumstances which increase the risk that the local permitting authority will seek to avoid the obligation to pay just compensation. Neither Nollan nor Dolan is, after all, a conventional regulatory takings case. Rather, as the court’s rationale for its result in Nollan demonstrates, both are cases in which the local government attached a condition to the issuance of a development permit which, but for the claim that the exaction is justified by the greater power to deny a permit altogether, would have amounted to an uncompensated requisition of private property.
[869]As Justice Scalia’s opinion in Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825, makes clear, such a discretionary context presents an inherent and heightened risk that local government will manipulate the police power to impose conditions unrelated to legitimate land use regulatory ends, thereby avoiding what would otherwise be an obligation to pay just compensation. In such a context, the heightened Nollan-Dolan standard of scrutiny works to dispel such concerns by assuring a constitutionally sufficient link between ends and means. It is the imposition of land-use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a permit scheme which by its nature allows for both the discretionary deployment of the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse, that constitutes the sine qua non for application of the intermediate standard of scrutiny formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan.
The remainder of our opinion seeks to demonstrate the accuracy of these conclusions, which we then apply to the record before us in this case.6
A
Nollan and the “Essential Nexus” Standard
In Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825, residential property owners challenged a requirement of the California Coastal Commission that they grant a lateral easement for public access across the back (or seaside) of their beachfront property as a condition for approval of a building permit to construct a larger [870]beach house. The issue, as the high court framed it, was not whether the permit condition would have deprived the Nollans of all economically viable use of their property (it would not have), but rather whether the exaction furthered a legitimate state interest. The Coastal Commission argued that the easement condition was necessary to foster “visual access" to the beach and to overcome the “psychological barrier” to its use created by shorefront development. (483 U.S. at p. 835 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 688].)
The Supreme Court assumed that the purposes advanced by the Coastal Commission represented legitimate state interests and were, at least in the abstract, constitutionally inoffensive. (483 U.S. at pp. 835-836 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 688].) The court explained, however, that “[t]he evident constitutional propriety disappears ... if the [permit] condition . . . utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.” (Id. at p. 837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689].) When “that essential nexus is eliminated,” the court observed, the legitimacy of the exaction is undermined and it “becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.” (Ibid., italics added.) Applying the newly minted “essential nexus” standard, the court found the required relationship between the Nollans’ permit condition and the asserted state interest to be absent. The permit condition was an easement for lateral access to allow visitors to traverse the Nollans’ property while passing from one beach to another. The court found it “quite impossible to understand” how such an easement furthered the “visual access” or lowered the “psychological barriers” of people already on the beach. (Id. at p. 838 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 690].) It was this absence of a link between the permit condition and the commission’s purported public purpose for requiring it that made the exaction a taking. (Id. at pp. 841-842 [97 L.Ed.2d at pp. 691-693].)7
[871]B
Dolan and the “Rough Proportionality” Standard
The “essential nexus” test announced in Nollan has recently been applied and extended by the high court in Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374. The facts and the holding in Dolan demand our particular attention in view of the court’s subsequent grant of certiorari in this case and its order directing the Court of Appeal to reexamine its prior judgment in light of the Dolan opinion. The facts were fairly straightforward. The plaintiff, Mrs. Dolan, owned a chain of plumbing and electrical supply stores, one of which—located in the City of Tigard, a Portland, Oregon suburb—she sought to expand by constructing a new building on the existing parcel, nearly doubling the retail sales space. The city had conditioned approval of the necessary building permit on dedications of a portion of the parcel for flood control and traffic improvements. Invoking its local development code, the city had required Mrs. Dolan to dedicate a percentage of the parcel adjacent to a floodplain as part of the city’s “Greenway” system to prevent additional stress on its storm drainage system. (Id. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 313, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2314].) To relieve traffic congestion in the downtown area, the city had also required the dedication of an additional 15-foot strip of land adjacent to the floodplain as a pedestrian/bicycle pathway. (Ibid.)
The city had made generalized findings concerning the relationship between its dedication conditions and the projected impacts of Mrs. Dolan’s project. As to the pedestrian pathway, the city’s planning commission had found it was “ reasonable to assume that customers and employees of the future uses of this site could utilize a pedestrian/bicycle pathway adjacent to this development for their transportation and recreational needs.’ ” (512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 314, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2314], italics added.) As for the drainage system dedication, the planning commission found that the “ ‘anticipated increased storm water flow from the subject property to an already strained creek and drainage basin can only add to the public need to manage the stream channel and floodplain for drainage purposes.’ ” (Id. at p. _[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 313, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2315], italics added.) The Oregon state courts upheld the city’s permit conditions, rejecting Mrs. Dolan’s argument that the dedication requirements were an uncompensated taking of her property because they were not sufficiently related to her proposed development project.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, establishing in its opinion a two-step procedure for analyzing so-called regulatory takings claims that [872]builds on the holding in Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825. First, as it had explained in Nollan, a court confronted with a property owner’s claim that conditions imposed by a local government for issuance of a development permit must “determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city.” (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p._ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 317, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2317], quoting Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689.) If the court finds the presence of such a nexus, it “must then decide the required degree of connection between the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.” (Id. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 317], italics added.)
In elaborating upon this latter requirement—one that had not appeared in the formulation adopted by the court in Nollan—the Chief Justice’s opinion observed that state courts “have been dealing with this problem a good deal longer than we have” and typically apply one of three standards. (512 U.S. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 319, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2318].) “In some States,” the court noted, “very generalized statements as to the necessary connections between the required dedication and the proposed development seem to suffice.” (Ibid.) The high court rejected this “deferential” standard as “too lax” to adequately protect a landowner’s right to just compensation if her property is taken for a public purpose. (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 319-320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].)
Other state courts have required a very strict correspondence between the exaction and the development, described as the “specifically and uniquely attributable test.” Under this standard, the local government must demonstrate that the exaction is precisely proportional to a burden directly and specifically created by the development; otherwise, the regulation becomes, in the words of the Illinois Supreme Court, “a veiled exercise of the power of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense of police regulations.” (Pioneer Trust & S. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect (1961) 22 Ill.2d 375 [176 N.E.2d 799, 802].) The high court also rejected this test as one requiring a more exacting standard of scrutiny than the federal Constitution demands. (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at pp. 319-320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].)
Still other states have adopted what the Dolan court characterized as an “intermediate position,” requiring the municipality to show a “reasonable relationship” between the required exaction and the impact of the proposed development. Typical of these, according to the court, is Simpson v. City of North Platte (1980) 206 Neb. 240 [292 N.W.2d 297], in which the Nebraska Supreme Court observed that the distinction between a proper exercise of the [873]police power and an improper exercise of eminent domain turned on whether there was “some reasonable relationship or nexus to the use to which the property is being made or is merely being used as an excuse for taking property simply because at that particular moment the landowner is asking the city for some license or permit.” (Id. at p. 301, italics added.) A city may not, the Nebraska high court held, impose an exaction for some future public use as a condition of permit approval when such future use is not “occasioned by the construction sought to be permitted.” (Id. at p. 302, italics added.)
The Dolan court concluded that the “reasonable relationship” test was the closest to the federal constitutional norm; it declined, however, to adopt the “reasonable relationship” terminology because of the potential for confusion with the less stringent “rational basis” standard describing “the minimal level of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].) Instead, the court adopted the term “rough proportionality,” explaining that such a formulation entails “some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” (Id. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2319-2320], italics added, fn. omitted.) Although, as the court explained, no “precise mathematical calculation is required,” the city must nevertheless “make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication” beyond mere conclusory statements that it will mitigate or offset some anticipated burden created by the project. (Id. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 323, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2322].)
Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Dolan court concluded that the city’s required dedications to its “Greenway” system and the pedestrian pathway were not “reasonably related” to Mrs. Dolan’s proposed development project. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the majority conceded that keeping portions of the floodplain adjacent to the petitioner’s property free of development could logically mitigate pressures on the city’s sewage system. However, the court observed, “the city demanded more—it not only wanted petitioner not to build in the floodplain, but it also wanted petitioner’s property along [the] Creek for its Green way system.” (512 U.S. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 321, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2320].) Yet nothing in the city’s findings explained “why a public greenway, as opposed to a private one, was required in the interest of flood control.” {Ibid., italics added.) The court thus found it “difficult to see” how public access to petitioner’s floodplain easement was “sufficiently related to the city’s [admittedly] legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along [the] Creek, and the city has not attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request.” (Id. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 321, 114 S.Ct. at pp. [874232]0-2321].) Hence, the court held, “the findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the petitioner’s proposed new building.” (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 322, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2321].)
As for the proposed pedestrian pathway dedication, the court likewise acknowledged that the property owner’s development might lead to increased traffic in the downtown streets. Nevertheless, it concluded the city had not demonstrated that the additional traffic generated by the development “reasonably relate[s] to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the pedestrian /bicycle pathway easement.” (512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 323, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2321.) The city had merely found that the creation of the pathway “ ‘could offset some of the traffic demand . . . and lessen the increase in traffic congestion.’ ” (Id. at pp. [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 323, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2321-2322], italics added, fn. omitted.) The fact that the pathway “could” have had such an effect, however, was insufficiently precise to demonstrate the constitutionally required relationship between the development and the compelled property dedication. “[T]he city must make some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/ bicycle pathway,” the court wrote, “beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated.” (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 323, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2322].) Concluding that “the findings upon which the city relies do not show the required reasonable relationship,” the court ordered the case remanded for further proceedings. (Id. at pp._,_ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 322, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2321, 2322].)
IV
Do Nollan and Dolan Apply to Nonpossessory Exactions?
Both Nollan and Dolan involved regulatory schemes under which the local government had required the possessory dedication of real property by the owner as a condition for issuing the necessary development permit. Moreover, language employed by Justice Scalia in his opinion for the majority in Nollan has been read by some students of the high court’s contemporary takings jurisprudence as limiting the operation of the “essential nexus” requirement to cases of possessory exactions. After observing that the high court’s modem takings cases had upheld land-use restrictions that “substantially advance” a legitimate state purpose (see, e.g., Agins v. Tiburon (1980) 447 U.S. 255 [65 L.Ed.2d 106, 100 S.Ct. 2138]), Justice Scalia wrote that “We are inclined to be particularly careful about the adjective [i.e., ‘substantial’] where the actual conveyance of property is made a condition for the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context there is heightened risk [875]that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.” (483 U.S. at p. 841 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 692], italics added.)
This case, of course, does not involve a demand by Culver City that the property owner convey a portion of the parcel for public use as a condition of granting his rezoning request and issuing a permit to build the desired condominium project. Rather, the city insists on a different kind of exaction as a condition for authorizing development: the payment of $280,000. Does this distinction in the nature of the exaction make the diptych of Nollan and Dolan inapplicable to this case? Some courts and commentators have concluded that it does.
In Blue Jeans Equities West v. City and County of San Francisco (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 164 [4 Cal.Rptr.2d 114], for example, our Court of Appeal concluded that “any heightened scrutiny test contained in Nollan is limited to possessory rather than regulatory takings cases.” (Id. at p. 171.) The Court of Appeal relied in part on the opinion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Commercial Builders v. Sacramento (9th Cir. 1991) 941 F.2d 872. There, a divided court had rejected a contention by commercial developers challenging a city ordinance conditioning nonresidential building permits on payment of a fee to offset municipal burdens associated with the influx of low-income workers relocating to fill jobs created by such projects, that Nollan imposed a heightened level of scrutiny on such fee exactions. Relying on other federal appellate court opinions that had “considered the constitutionality of ordinances that placed burdens on land use after Nollan’'’ the majority concluded that “[n]one have interpreted that case as changing the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations that do not constitute a physical encroachment on land.” (Id. at p. 874, citing St. Bartholomew’s Church v. City of New York (2d Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 348, 357, fn. 6, cert. den. sub nom. Committee to Oppose Sale of St. Bartholomew’s Church v. Rector (1991) 499 U.S. 905 [113 L.Ed.2d 214, 111 S.Ct. 1103]; Adolph v. Federal Emergency Management Agency (5th Cir. 1988) 854 F.2d 732, 737; Naegele Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of Durham (4th Cir. 1988) 844 F.2d 172, 178; see also Leroy Land Dev. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (9th Cir. 1991) 939 F.2d 696.) “As a threshold matter,” the Ninth Circuit concluded, “we are not persuaded that Nollan materially changes the level of scrutiny we must apply” to the Sacramento ordinance at issue. (941 F.2d at p. 874; see also Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist Court, supra, 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 53, 166.)
There is no question that the takings clause is specially protective of property against physical occupation or invasion—a proposition that the [876]court’s opinion in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. (1982) 458 U.S. 419 [73 L.Ed.2d 868, 102 S.Ct. 3164] makes clear. It is also true, as the city points out, that government generally has greater leeway with respect to noninvasive forms of land-use regulation, where the courts have for the most part given greater deference to its power to impose broadly applicable fees, whether in the form of taxes, assessments, user or development fees. Both Blue Jean Equities West v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 3 Cal.App.4th 164, and Commercial Builders v. Sacramento, supra, 941 F.2d 872, dealt with such legislatively formulated development assessments imposed on a broad class of property owners. Fees of this nature may indeed be subject to a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny than that formulated by the court in Nollan and Dolan because the heightened risk of the “extortionate” use of the police power to exact unconstitutional conditions is not present. Nonetheless, we reject the proposition that Nollan and Dolan are entirely without application to monetary exactions. When such exactions are imposed—as in this case—neither generally nor ministerially, but on an individual and discretionary basis, we conclude that the heightened standard of judicial scrutiny of Nollan and Dolan is triggered.
One of the central promises of the takings clause is that truly public burdens will be publicly borne. Where the regulatory land-use power of local government is deployed against individual property owners through the use of conditional permit exactions, the Nollan test helps to secure that promise by assuring that the monopoly power over development permits is not illegitimately exploited by imposing conditions that lack any logical affinity to the public impact of a particular land use. The essential nexus test is, in short, a “means-ends” equation, intended to limit the government’s bargaining mobility in imposing permit conditions on individual property owners— whether they consist of possessory dedications or the exaction of cash payments—that, because they appear to lack any evident connection to the public impact of the proposed land use, may conceal an illegitimate demand—may, in other words, amount to “ ‘out-and-out . . . extortion.’ ” (Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689].)
Under this view of the constitutional role of the consolidated “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” tests, it matters little whether the local land use permit authority demands the actual conveyance of property or the payment of a monetary exaction. In a context in which the contraints imposed by legislative and political processes are absent or substantially reduced, the risk of too elastic or diluted a takings standard—the vice of distributive injustice in the allocation of civic costs—is heightened in either case. Support for this view of the scope of the test can be drawn from a close reading of the text of Justice Scalia’s opinion in Nollan and from the Chief Justice’s opinion in Dolan.
[877]A
The Nollan opinion begins its substantive analysis of the takings claim with the proposition that “[h]ad California simply required the Nollans to make an easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in order to increase public access to the beach ... we have no doubt there would have been a taking." (483 U.S. at p. 831 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 685].) Assuming the state’s unilateral and uncompensated requisition of a lateral easement from the Nollans would have offended the takings clause, the court then asked “whether requiring [an easement] to be conveyed as a condition for issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome.” (Id. at p. 834 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 687].) The answer to that question, the court said, was “yes.” The imposition of a permit condition that “serves the same legitimate police-power purposes as a refusal to issue the permit," the high court reasoned, “should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not constitute a taking.” (Id. at p. 836 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689], italics added.) “Thus, if the Commission attached to the permit some condition that would have protected the public’s ability to see the beach notwithstanding construction of the new house ... so long as the Commission could have exercised its police power ... to forbid construction of the house altogether, imposition of the condition would also be constitutional.” (Ibid.)
The heart of the takings analysis, Justice Scalia’s opinion continued, lay in the presence (or absence) of a link between the commission’s power to deny the Nollans a development permit altogether, and its power to impose a condition on its issuance that furthers the same end as an outright prohibition on development. “If a prohibition designed to accomplish that purpose would be a legitimate exercise of the police power rather than a taking, it would be strange to conclude that providing the owner an alternative to that prohibition which accomplishes the same purpose is not.” (483 U.S. at pp. 836-837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689], italics added.)
The vice of the commission’s permit condition in Nollan, however, was the absence of any logical connection between the condition and the purported justification for an outright ban on development. “The evident constitutional propriety”—between denying a permit and conditioning its issuance on achieving the same purpose through alternative means— “disappears,” the court wrote, “if the condition substituted for the prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition. When that essential nexus is eliminated, the situation becomes the same as if California law forbade shouting fire in a crowed theater, but granted dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the state treasury. . . [T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the original [878]purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of compensation.” (483 U.S. at p. 837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689], italics added.)
“In short,” Justice Scalia concluded, “unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’ ” (483 U.S. at p. 837 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689], quoting J.E.D. Associates v. Town of Atkinson (1981) 121 N.H. 581 [432 A.2d 12, 14-15], italics added.)8
In briefing before this court, plaintiff and several supporting amici curiae insist that because the club was a privately operated facility, accessible only by dues-paying members, a zoning change withdrawing the parcel from such private recreational use could not have a cognizable public impact as a matter of law. The trial court, in its memorandum opinion granting judgment for plaintiff, adopted this argument, reasoning that “[plaintiff’s] club . . . was at all times private property; the city never owned any interest in it nor was any part of it ever dedicated to public use. . . . [Plaintiff’s] actions cannot be said to deprive the City of tennis courts, because neither did [plaintiff] have an affirmative duty to provide tennis courts to the City or its residents nor would tennis courts necessarily be available to the City but for [plaintiff’s] project. . . . [^D The City could have condemned a portion of [plaintiff’s] property for use as City tennis courts, but the City would then of course have had to pay for the land. Here, instead of taking land for which it would have had to pay, the City proposes to take not land but money. This is equally impermissible.”
The assumption that, because property is designated for private recreational use, it lacks public value and that its subsequent withdrawal has no [879]public impact is flawed as a matter of logic. Although privately owned and operated, plaintiff’s health club was a business establishment, accessible to the public on the payment of a membership fee. The opportunity of Culver City residents to use such private recreational facilities created a public benefit by enlarging the availability of such facilities. Without such a facility, residents would have to travel farther, wait longer, and put up with other inconveniences and restricted choices in their recreational pursuits. Thus, the fact that a recreational facility is privately rather than publicly owned does not erase its value to the public.
This principle—that the discontinuation of a private land use may have distinctly public consequences—is well accepted in land-use law. Indeed, in Nollan itself Justice Scalia as much as conceded that the loss of private open space resulting from residential beach development could lead to an adverse public impact—a diminution of coastal views—justifying a requirement that the Nollans “provide a viewing spot on their property for passersby with whose sighting of the ocean their new house would interfere.” (483 U.S at p. 836 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 689].) Although, as we explain below, the fact that a recreational facility is privately rather than publicly owned may affect the magnitude of the value the city may constitutionally place on its loss, private status alone does not per se erase its intrinsic public value for land-use regulatory purposes. In short, it is well accepted in both the case and statutory law that the discontinuance of a private land use can have a significant impact justifying a monetary exaction to alleviate it. We perceive no reason why the same cannot be said of the loss of land devoted to private recreational use through its withdrawal from such a use as a result of being “up zoned” to accommodate incompatible uses.
There thus exists a potential basis in logic for a connection between a social need generated by plaintiff’s condominium project and the $280,000 mitigation fee imposed by the city.
B
The opinion by the Chief Justice in Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374, both incorporates the essential nexus test of Nollan, and takes the next analytical step—determining the extent to which the takings clause imposes not only a logical connection between a permit condition and the public impact of a given land use, but dictates the nature of the required “fit” between means and ends. While the court in Nollan was concerned with the nature of the relationship between a proposed development and a governmental exaction, its focus in Dolan is on the degree of the required connection. Instead of asking “what is the nature of the relationship between a given permit [880]condition and the public costs of a proposed land use” (a question answered in Nollan by the “essential nexus” formulation), the court asked in Dolan “[W]hat is the required degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected impact[] of the proposed development?” (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 311, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2312], italics added.)
The answer to that question, as we have seen, is twofold. The condition imposed by the challenged regulation must not only be roughly proportional, the Dolan court held, both in “nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development” (512 U.S. at p__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2320]), but the required proportionality must be demonstrated by “some sort of individualized determination.” (Id. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].) The court framed the first leg of its rough proportionality test as an inquiry into “whether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city’s permit conditions bear the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner’s proposed development.” (Id. at p._[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 318,114 S.Ct. at p. 2318].) The antecedent question underlying that inquiry is, of course, the exact nature of the “required relationship” imposed by the takings clause. As we have seen, the court answered its own question by applying an “intermediate” level of constitutional scrutiny— “rough proportionality”—to the relationship between the city’s permit conditions and the public costs associated with Mrs. Dolan’s proposed development.
We need not repeat here the extended account of the Dolan court’s reasoning set out above (ante, at pp. 869-872), except to note that, as we read the high court’s opinion, the chief analytical advance of Dolan over the formulation by the court in Nollan appears to lie in the requirement that the local permit authority “make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.” (512 U.S. at pp__-__[129 L.Ed.2d at p. 320, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2319-2320], italics added, fn. omitted.) We view the requirement that the local government demonstrate a factually sustainable proportionality between the effects of a proposed land use and a given exaction as one which furthers the assurances implicit in the Nollan test that the condition at issue is more than theoretically or even plausibly related to legitimate regulatory ends.
Nollan and Dolan are thus concerned with implementing one of the fundamental principles of modem takings jurisprudence—“to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” (Armstrong [881]v. United States, supra, 364 U.S at p. 49 [4 L.Ed.2d at p. 1561].) Of course, as we have already observed, it is not at all clear that the rationale (and the heightened standard of scrutiny) of Nollan and Dolan applies to cases in which the exaction takes the form of a generally applicable development fee or assessment—cases in which the courts have deferred to legislative and political processes to formulate “public programas] adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.” (Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City (1978) 438 U.S. 104, 124 [57 L.Ed.2d 631, 648, 98 S.Ct. 2646].) But when a local government imposes special, discretionary permit conditions on development by individual property owners —as in the case of the recreational fee at issue in this case—Nollan and Dolan require that such conditions, whether they consist of possessory dedications or monetary exactions, be scrutinized under the heightened standard.
V
Applying the Heightened Standard in This Case
We come, then, to the application of the combined Nollan-Dolan “essential nexus” and “rough proportionality” test to the facts in the record before us. Like the high court in Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374, we will conclude that, although the city’s findings with respect to the relationship between the monetary exaction and the withdrawal of a parcel of land within Culver City restrictively zoned for private recreational use satisfies the essential nexus standard, the present record is inadequate to support the requirement that plaintiff pay a recreational fee of $280,000 for the desired permit. We conclude instead that although the city may be able to justify a monetary exaction in some amount, what that figure is we are quite unable to say on this record.
A
The land-use limitation on which the city relies to justify its $280,000 fee exaction consists of a restriction of plaintiff’s use of his property to commercial recreational activities, a restriction that could not be changed without amending both Culver City’s general plan and the specific plan applicable to the parcel. It is well settled that such a limitation on use is constitutional unless the restriction “does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.” (Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 260 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 112].)
The general purpose of zoning and planning is to regulate the use of land to promote the public welfare, a power the courts have construed very [882]broadly. Indeed, one of the traditional uses of the police power lies in providing citizens adequate recreational opportunities. (See, e.g., Associated Home Builders, supra, 4 Cal.3d 633, 638 [“The elimination of open space in California is a melancholy aspect of the unprecedented population increase which has characterized our state in the last few decades. . . . [Gjovemmental entities have the responsibility to provide park and recreation land to accommodate this human expansion . . . .”].) We thus have no doubt that the use of zoning to facilitate the availability of private recreational facilities to the residents of Culver City is within the scope of the city’s police power.
Nor is it an unreasonable use of the police power for the city to prescribe not only broad categories of land use, such as “commercial” and “residential,” but to specify, through a general plan, specific plan, and zoning regulations, the types of businesses that can be carried on at a given site, so long, of course, as the restrictions meet the two-part standard embodied in Agins v. City of Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255. The record before us indicates that private recreational facilities were in scarce supply in the city and merited preservation and promotion. As the 1988 city staff analysis of plaintiff’s proposed project noted, “Culver City as a fully-developed urban city has very little open space in which to develop parks and related recreational facilities. By national standards ... the City is deficient in park space, tennis courts, swimming facilities, gymnasiums and the recreational activity centers needed to maintain and enhance the ‘quality of life’ in our community.”
We thus have no doubt as to the city’s legitimate authority to impose development impact fees for park and recreational purposes. (See Associated Home Builders, supra, 4 Cal.3d 633; Gov. Code, §§ 66001, 66477.) Nor is there any genuine dispute that the $280,000 fee, which the city has committed to the purchase of additional recreational facilities, will substantially advance its legitimate interest in correcting a demonstrated deficiency in municipal recreational resources. Unlike Nollan, where the high court found no logical connection between the commission’s demand for a lateral easement across the owner’s property and the purported governmental purpose of enhancing visual access, the “essential nexus” in this case is plain.
B
We must next decide whether there is a “rough proportionality” between the public impact of the land use change and the recreational fee. The Dolan court, in an effort to balance the government’s legitimate need to impose reasonable exactions against the property owner’s right to be free of undue [883]burdens, formulated an intermediate standard of review and a corresponding evidentiary burden on local government. “[Generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the required dedication and the proposed development” are constitutionally insufficient, according to the court. (512 U.S. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 319, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2318].) As noted, however, the Dolan majority also rejected the claim that the government “demonstrate that its exaction is directly proportional to the specifically created need” as being more than the Fifth Amendment demands. (Id. at p. _ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 319, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2319].)
In both Nollan and Dolan, the court conceded that the development project at issue would have negative effects that the city could mitigate using its police power. It found insufficiently substantial, however, the connection between those effects and the required public dedications. Similarly, the record before us in this case is devoid of any individualized findings to support the required “fit” between the monetary exaction and the loss of a parcel zoned for commercial recreational use. The city argues that its $280,000 recreation fee is warranted as partial compensation for the loss of some $800,000 in recreational improvements that were formerly located on plaintiff’s property. But in this case it is error to measure the lost recreational benefits by the lost value of plaintiff’s health club. The loss which the city seeks to mitigate by levying the contested recreational fee is not the loss of any particular recreational facility, but the loss of property reserved for private recreational use.
The city appears to be arguing, implicitly, that if it had refused to change its general and specific plan designations, and insisted on a private recreational use of the land, a new recreational facility would have been resurrected on the site, one containing four tennis court or their equivalent. From this premise, the city asserts that the change in land use granted plaintiff has resulted in the “loss” of four tennis courts that would have been built had that land-use change not been granted. Even if such a supposition could be proven, however, it would still not justify the $280,000 fee, because the cost of these new private tennis courts would have been paid for by the fees of the private club members and the courts would have been private, not open to all members of the public free of charge.
Thus, under the city’s formula, the public would receive, ex gratia, $280,000 worth of recreational facilities the cost of which it would otherwise have to finance through membership fees. Plaintiff is being asked to pay for something that should be paid for either by the public as a whole, or by a private entrepreneur in business for a profit. The city may not constitutionally measure the magnitude of its loss, or of the recreational exaction, by the value of facilities it had no right to appropriate without payment.
[884]This is not to say, however, that some type of recreational fee imposed by the city as a condition of the zoning and related changes cannot be justified. The amount of such a fee, however, must be tied more closely to the actual impact of the land-use change the city granted plaintiff. Although we are unable to discern, on this record, the precise value or the economic cost of these impacts, several possibilities suggest themselves. One such possibility is likely to be the additional administrative expenses incurred in redesignating other property within Culver City for recreational use. The city’s director of human services, who opposed the abandonment of a recreational use restriction on plaintiff’s property, stated that to “permit this type of recreational development elsewhere would . . . involve arduous and costly rezoning and public hearings.” It would be reasonable to require plaintiff to contribute toward defraying these anticipated rezoning costs, so that the city does not have to bear them itself or pass them along to future private developers seeking to construct recreational facilities.
More generally, the city’s approval of plaintiff’s condominium project may have given rise to public costs in the form of a diminished ability to attract private recreational development. If the city can show that it would have to incur greater costs to attract a developer of suitable private recreational facilities because plaintiff’s parcel is no longer reserved for such a recreational use, it may consider these costs to be a part of the impact of plaintiff’s project, and would be constitutionally permitted to impose such an exaction. Such a fee would enable the city to induce private health club development by offering monetary incentives roughly proportional to the land use incentive it relinquished when it removed the recreational use restriction from plaintiff’s property.
Of course, the city could not constitutionally require plaintiff to dedicate the same amount of land for public recreational facilities. It could, however, require plaintiff to transfer, so to speak, the restricted land-use designation at the Overland Avenue site to a comparable parcel plaintiff owns within the city, thus returning the city to the status quo as it existed prior to approval of the condominium project, that is, with a similar parcel of vacant land reserved for recreational use as an inducement to the development of private recreational facilities. If the city decides, however, that such a restricted land-use transfer is impracticable, it may surely levy an in-lieu exaction to accomplish the same objective. Such a fee would serve the same purpose as do all development fees: providing the city with a means of escaping the narrow choice between denying plaintiff his project permit altogether or subordinating legitimate public interests to plaintiff’s development plans.
We cannot say, on this incomplete record, what, if any, recreational fee the evidence might justify. Although in calculating its net cost as a result of [885]upzoning the Overland Avenue parcel the city must take into account any relative benefit that plaintiff’s project would contribute to the public interest for which the fee is imposed, the record suggests that some exaction may be warranted. It is thus appropriate to return the case to the city to reconsider its valuation of the fee in light of the principles we have articulated. Remand to the city was apparently what occurred in Dolan itself after the case was returned to the Oregon Supreme Court. (See Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 319 Or. 567 [877 P.2d 1201] [the case is “remanded to the City of Tigard for further proceedings.”].) Following remand, the city must determine whether and to what extent approval of plaintiff’s requested land-use changes justify the imposition of a recreation fee as a means of compensating it for the additional costs of attracting the development of comparable private recreational facilities for its residents. The determination of such a fee will, of course, require the city to make specific findings supported by substantial evidence—that is, the city “must make some effort to quantify its findings” supporting any fee, beyond “conclusory statements,” although “[n]o precise mathematical calculation is required” either by the takings clause or the Act. (Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. at p._ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 323, 114 S.Ct. at p. 2322].)
VI
The Art in Public Places Fee
Under the city’s art in public places ordinance, plaintiff could not receive a certificate of occupancy for any of the 30 townhouses in the project until he either paid $32,200 to the city art fund (1 percent of the total building valuation) or contributed an approved work of art of an equivalent value. Under the latter option, the art may either be placed on site, in which case it remains the property of the applicant, or it may be donated to the city for placement elsewhere. Although petitioner initially opted to pay the fee, his successor in interest subsequently placed art of his own choosing on the site and received the 30 certificates of occupancy during the pendency of this action.
Plaintiff contends that the required dedication of art or the cash equivalent thereof constitutes a taking under the Nollan-Dolan standards. This follows, he asserts, from the fact that the city made no individualized determination that the art mitigates a need generated by the project.
The city defends the art fee on several grounds. As a threshold matter, it contends plaintiff failed to preserve his right to litigate the claim because his successor satisfied the requirements of the ordinance and accepted the [886]benefit of receiving all 30 certificates of occupancy during the pendency of these proceedings. The record shows, however, that plaintiff filed a written protest to the imposition of the fee in accordance with Government Code section 66020, and subsequently entered into an agreement with the city in which he preserved his right to maintain this “lawsuit” challenging both the recreation fee and the art fee. Thus, the claim has not been waived.
Nevertheless, we agree with the city that the art in public places fee is not a development exaction of the kind subject to the Nollan-Dolan takings analysis. As both the trial court and the Court of Appeal concluded, the requirement to provide either art or a cash equivalent thereof is more akin to traditional land-use regulations imposing minimal building setbacks, parking and lighting conditions, landscaping requirements, and other design conditions such as color schemes, building materials and architectural amenities. Such aesthetic conditions have long been held to be valid exercises of the city’s traditional police power, and do not amount to a taking merely because they might incidentally restrict a use, diminish the value, or impose a cost in connection with the property. (See, e.g., Metromedia Inc. v. San Diego (1980) 453 U.S. 490, 508, fn. 13 [69 L.Ed.2d 800, 815, 101 S.Ct. 2882] [approving prohibition against outdoor advertising]; Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, 438 U.S. 104 [upholding municipal power to preserve landmark structures]; Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255 [upholding condition to preserve scenic views].) The requirement of providing art in an area of the project reasonably accessible to the public is, like other design and landscaping requirements, a kind of aesthetic control well within the authority of the city to impose.
Conclusion
A generation ago, an observer of the high court’s takings jurisprudence called the question of when land-use regulation under the police power becomes compensable “the most haunting jurisprudential problem in the field of contemporary land-use law.” (Harr, Land-Use Planning (3d ed. 1977) 766, quoted in The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, supra, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 241.) After more than half a century during which the content of the takings clause lay comparatively unexamined—roughly between Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon (1922) 260 U.S. 393 [67 L.Ed. 322, 43 S.Ct. 158, 28 A.L.R. 1321], and Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, 438 U.S. 104—the high court decided no less than eight such cases in a little more than a decade.9 As several commentators have observed, the task of making this blitz of opinions doctrinally coherent is daunting; even the [887]short-term direction of the court’s recent takings jurisprudence remains uncertain. Perhaps Nollan and Dolan mark, as some scholars have suggested, “a major shift of the power of government in land use cases.” (Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, supra, 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 43); perhaps, as others have argued, they represent “a step backwards” from the heightened protection of property rights. (Note, Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 448, 468.) Our own reading lies somewhere between these two margins.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed; the cause is remanded to that court with directions to order the case returned to the City of Culver City.
Lucas, C. J., and George, J., concurred.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.
A “specific plan” implements and refines the general plan by allowing for greater specificity as to permissible uses. (Gov. Code, § 65450.)
Plaintiff was also apparently required to pay a $30,000 in-lieu “parkland” fee pursuant to section 33-E.l of the Culver City Municipal Code, to provide ostensibly for local park and recreational facilities to serve the residents of plaintiff’s condominium development. Plaintiff has not challenged this in-lieu fee in the present action.
The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.” The Fifth Amendment was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Chicago, B & Q Ry. Co. v. Chicago (1897) 166 U.S. 226 [41 L.Ed. 979, 17 S.Ct. 581].
The parallel provision of the California Constitution provides, “Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just compensation ... has first been paid to, or into court for, the owner.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 19.)
In its brief on the merits, the city has raised two additional issues. It asserts that plaintiff preserved only his right to challenge the exactions under the Act. This argument was not raised below or in a counterpetition for review; it is therefore not cognizable before this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29(b)(1).) Furthermore, it is factually inaccurate. The city also asserts that the takings challenge is somehow not “ripe” because plaintiff waived all but his statutory challenge to the fees. The argument was not raised below and is therefore not cognizable before this court. Moreover, as noted above, it is also factually untenable.
Contrary to the assertion of Justice Kennard that “[t]his case was litigated under the takings clause, not our state’s Mitigation Fee Act; thus, there is no need to construe the Mitigation Fee Act to decide this case” (conc. & dis. opn. of Kennard, J., post, at p. 903), plaintiff complied with the requirements of the Act by asserting both statutory and the constitutional takings claims in his protest. (See fn. 4, ante, at p. 865.) We resolve plaintiff’s claim in the context of the Act for the reasons set forth in the main text, that is, the unqualified statutory language channeling all protests to development fees through the procedures prescribed by the Act and the formulaic identity of the statutory and constitutional standards.
Scholarly comment on the two cases is almost unmanageably large. (See, e.g., Kmiec, At Last, The Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle (1995) 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y. 147; Kendall & Ryan, “Paying" for the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan (1995) 81 Va. L. Rev. 1801; Funk, Reading Dolan v. City of Tigard (1995) 25 Envtl. L. 127; Huffman, Dolan v. City of Tigard: Another Step in the Right Direction (1995) 25 Envtl. L. at p. 143; Kushner, Property and Mysticism: The Legality of Exactions as a Condition for Public Development Approval in the Time of the Rehnquist Court (1992) 8 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 53; Been, ‘Exit’ as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine (1991) 91 Colum. L. Rev. 473; Notes, “ ‘Take’ My Beach Please!”: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and a Rational-Nexus Constitutional Analysis of Development Exactions (1989) 69 B. U. L. Rev. 823; Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither Weak Nor Obtuse (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630; Lawrence, Means, Motives, and Takings: The Nexus Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1988) 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 231; Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and the Limits of Consent (1988) 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 58; Michelman, Takings, 1987 (1988) 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600; Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection (1987) 1987 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1; Karlin, Back to the Future: From Nollan to Lochner (1988) 17 Sw.U. L. Rev. 627; Peterson, Land Use Regulatory ‘Takings’ Revisited: The New Supreme Court Approaches (1988) 39 Hastings L. J. 335; Falik & Shimko, The “Takings" Nexus—The Supreme Court Chooses a New Direction in Land-Use Planning: A View From California (1988) 39 Hastings L. J. 359; Note: Taking a Step Back: A Reconsideration of the Takings Test of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1988) 102 Harv. L. Rev. 448; The Supreme Court—Leading Cases (1988) 101 Harv. L. Rev. 119, 240.)
The Nollan majority also made clear that the standard for evaluating a takings claim differs from that applied to a due process challenge. The latter, the majority explained, requires merely that the state “could rationally have decided” that the land-use regulation adopted could achieve its objective, and thus invokes only a minimal level of judicial review. (483 U.S. at p. 834, fn. 3 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 688], italics omitted.) To survive a takings claim, however, the court stressed that the regulation must “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest. {Ibid.) Thus, the Nollan majority consciously embraced what Justice Brennan had critically characterized as a more “demanding standard” (483 U.S. at p. 848 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 696] (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.)) requiring a more “precise fit between the forms of burden and [the permit] condition . . . .” than had previously been demanded for purposes of due process. (Id. at p. 847 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 696].)
In a particularly expressive rejoinder to Justice Brennan, the Nollan majority rejected the argument that the easement condition represented a reasonable “exchange” in return for the “benefit” of the development permit, declaring that “the right to build on one’s own property—even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting requirements— [871]cannot remotely be described as a ‘governmental benefit.’ ” (483 U.S. at pp. 833-834, fn. 2 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 687].)
Justice Scalia, the author of the majority opinion in Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825, elaborated on his view of the essence of the takings clause in his dissent in Pennell v. San Jose (1988) 485 U.S. 1, 15 [99 L.Ed.2d 1, 17, 108 S.Ct. 849], a case challenging a rent control ordinance on the ground that one of its criteria for increases—whether a proposed hike would work a hardship to a tenant—constituted an uncompensated taking. Although a majority held the takings claim premature, Justice Scalia would have held “that the . . . provision . . . effects a taking of private property without just compensation . . . .” (Ibid.) Invoking the language of Armstrong v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 40, 49 [4 L.Ed.2d 1554, 1561, 80 S.Ct. 1563], his dissent reasoned that “[traditional land-use regulation . . . does not violate” the principle embodied in Armstrong “because there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy.” (485 U.S. at p. 20 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 19] (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).) The essence of the takings clause, the dissent reasoned, “is simply the unfairness of making one citizen pay, in some fashion other than taxes, to remedy a social problem that is none of his creation.” (Id. at p. 23 [99 L.Ed.2d at p. 22]; cf. Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. at p. 825, fn. 4 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 688].)
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, supra, 438 U.S. 104; Agins v. Tiburon, supra, 447 U.S. 255; Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., supra, 458 U.S. 419; Keystone [887]Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis (1987) 480 U.S. 470, 485 [94 L.Ed.2d 472, 488, 107 S.Ct. 1232]; First Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County (1987) 482 U.S. 304 [96 L.Ed.2d 250, 107 S.Ct. 2378]; Nollan, supra, 483 U.S. 825; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-1016 [120 L.Ed.2d 798, 813-814, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893-2894]; Dolan, supra, 512 U.S. 374.