Carpenter v. Devitt

California Court of Appeal Feb 2, 1942 No. Civ. 11815Published

Before: Dooling

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Holding. The court held that a sheriff and an execution creditor are bound by the same estoppel that prevents a judgment debtor from denying a transfer of property, even if the vehicle registration was not updated. Consequently, the sheriff is liable for conversion for seizing property that the judgment debtor was estopped from claiming.

Issues

Whether a sheriff and execution creditor are bound by an estoppel that prevents a judgment debtor from denying a transfer of vehicle ownership.
Whether the failure to update vehicle registration under Section 186 of the Vehicle Code precludes a claim of ownership when the transferor is estopped to deny the transfer.

Disposition. Affirmed

Quotations verified verbatim against the opinion

“The execution creditor and the sheriff acting for him in attempting to satisfy the judgment debt by execution are privies of the judgment debtor and take no better title than the judgment debtor possesses.”

“It is too elementary to need citation of authority that if the corporation is estopped, in absence of fraud, the estoppel likewise applies against the creditors of the corporation.”

DOOLING, J. pro tem.

Appeal from a judgment for the value of an automobile in an action for conversion. Defendant and appellant, as sheriff of Santa Cruz County, levied a writ of execution upon the automobile to satisfy a judgment against A. R. Carpenter. Plaintiff and respondent filed a third party claim pursuant to section 689, Code of Civil Procedure, and the execution creditor having given the sheriff the undertaking provided for in that section, the sheriff sold the automobile at execution sale. This action followed.

The evidence showed that one Watkins, a dealer, had originally sold the automobile to A. R. Carpenter on conditional sale contract. A. R. Carpenter having defaulted in certain payments Watkins repossessed the automobile. Thereafter respondent J. L. Carpenter (who is the father of A. R. Carpenter), A. R. Carpenter and Watkins entered into an agreement among themselves whereby respondent assumed the balance of the payments under the contract with his son, paid Watkins the amount then due plus the costs of repossession and the ear was delivered to respondent as purchaser. The car had been registered in the names of Watkins as legal owner and A. R. Carpenter as registered owner. No change was made in the registration. Respondent continued to make the payments to Watkins a,nd at the time of the levy on the car only one monthly instalment remained unpaid. The indebtedness upon which the judgment and execution were based was not incurred in reliance upon the apparent ownership of the car by A. R. Carpenter.

Appellant relies upon section 186 of the Vehicle Code and the case of

Coca Cola Bottling Co.

Feliciano,

32 Cal. App. (2d) 351 [89 Pac. (2d) 686], Section 186 of the Vehicle Code read at the time of the execution:

“No transfer of the title or any interest in or to a vehicle registered hereunder shall pass nor shall delivery of any said vehicle be deemed to have been made and any attempted

[475]

transfer shall not be effective for any purpose until transfer of registration is made and the department has issued a new certificate of ownership and registration card with respect thereto as provided herein, except as a transferor may be estopped by law to deny a transfer. ...”

Carpenter v. Devitt

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