Estate of Chamberlain

McCOMB, J.

These appeals, transferred from the Supreme Court to this court for decision, pursuant to the provisions of article VI, section 4c of the Constitution of the State of California, are from a decree of the superior court sitting in probate in a proceeding to determine heirship, finding that 1) Horace B. English, Charles H. English, and Dorothy English Sampson are the residuary legatees of decedent, and 2) Charles H. English, Horace B. English, and Dorothy English Sampson are the heirs of decedent, and 3) Mildred Jordan is entitled to certain property mentioned in the will of decedent.

The essential facts are:

Frances R. Chamberlain died testate in Los Angeles County October 12, 1939. She left an olographic will dated March 29, 1939, which was duly admitted to probate. The olo

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graphic will written on twenty-four sheets of paper contained, so far as material here, the following provisions:

“Will of Frances R. Chamberlain.

After paying these amounts— and amts, due for administrator and attorney, whatever remains of cash — shall be devided between Charles English Horace English Dorothy Sampson children of my deceased sister, ‘share & share alike’— After distributing the few personal possessions listed on other pages— all the rest & residue, I give to Mrs. Mildred Jordan — this includes any furniture

rugs

— & personal apparel &e. nothing of much value — but may be helpful to dear friends — To whom she will distribute said belongings with the help of Bert Mankin and Mary Dale — or Mrs. Gladys Rice.”

These are the only questions necessary for us to determine:

First: Bid decedent dispose of the rest and residue of her estate by her luill?

Second: Bid the word “cash”, as used by decedent in the portion of her will above mentioned, include stocks and bonds?

The first question must be answered in the affirmative. The law is established that, if the language of a will is definite, certain and unambiguous, it will be taken to be an accurate and precise expression of decedent’s intention, and the court is without authority to consider extrinsic evidence or extraneous circumstances in arriving at the decedent’s intent (see cases cited, 26 Cal. Jur. [1926] 889, sec. 205, note 12).