Dickinson v. Pacific Greyhound Lines
Before: Schauer
SCHAUER, P. J.
Defendant appeals from a judgment entered against it on a verdict in an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff when the automobile he was operating was struck in a through highway intersection by a bus operated by defendant.
The intersection involved is that of San Fernando Eoad and Sheldon Street in Los Angeles County. San Fernando Eoad, a four-lane paved boulevard, fifty-five feet wide, is sign posted as a through highway (Veh. Code, § 471) and in this locale runs generally northwesterly and southeasterly; Sheldon Street, unpaved, thirty feet in width, runs northeasterly and southwesterly. For convenience at the trial, however, San Fernando Eoad was spoken of as running north and
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south and Sheldon Street as running east and west. To avoid confusion we follow the directional nomenclature used in the trial court.
On August 31, 1940, between 7:00 p. m. and 7:30 p. m., as darkness was setting in, the plaintiff was driving east on Sheldon. After entering its intersection with San Fernando Eoad and crossing, or at least reaching, the center of such intersection, his car, while traveling at about ten to fifteen miles per hour, was struck by defendant’s bus, approaching from plaintiff’s left and traveling south at sixty-five to seventy miles per hour. The lights of both plaintiff’s car and defendant’s bus were on at all times concerned. Plaintiff was severely injured in the collision.
Defendant states its contention on appeal as follows: ‘1 The evidence conclusively shows plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, proximately contributing to his injury and barring his right of recovery ... [in that]
“(a) Plaintiff failed to stop before entering the ‘through highway’. ...
“(b) Plaintiff entered the ‘through highway’ . . . against the immediate hazard of collision with the approaching bus . . . [and]
“(c) Plaintiff, upon and after entering the intersection in question, failed to look again in the direction of the approaching bus.”
Defendant’s contention is not supported by the record. As to its proposition (a), that the plaintiff failed to stop before entering the through highway, the evidence includes the following: (Testimony by plaintiff) ‘‘Q. When you reached the point marked on the map as D-l [entrance to intersection] what did you do? A. I stopped and looked to see if there were any cars coming. Q. Did you bring your ear to a complete stop ? A. I did. ’ ’ There was also direct testimony of several witnesses that plaintiff had stopped his ear a few feet back, of the stop sign which was stipulated to be located “approximately 40 feet west from the intersection.” The above quoted testimony effectually disposes of defendant’s argument on the point involved. Any discrepancies in plaintiff’s testimony or between it and other evidence served at most to create a conflict which the jury resolved adversely to defendant.
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