People v. Bechtel

SHENK, J.

This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction on four counts of grand theft and from orders denying the defendant ⅛ motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment.

On November 30,1950, the defendant was tried on an indictment charging the following offenses: Count I: violation of section 67½ of the Penal Code (offering bribe to public official) ; Count II: grand theft against Dr. Theodore J. Bluechel, committed on or about July 11, 1950; Count III: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about June 24, 1950; Count IV: grand theft committed against Bluechel on or about June 17, 1950; Count V: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about June 10, 1950; Count VI: violation of section 653f of the Penal Code (solicitation), committed on or about November 15, 1949. On February 13, 1951, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on Counts II, III, IV, V and VI and disagreed on Count I.

On February 14, 1951, one day following the verdicts under the first indictment, a second indictment was returned and filed in which Bechtel was accused of the following offenses: Count I: conspiracy to violate section 67½ of the Penal Code; Count II, grand theft against Dr. Theodore J. Bluechel, committed on or about August 20, 1949; Count III: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about August 27, 1949; Count IV: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about September 3, 1949; Count V: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about September 10, 1949; Count VI: grand theft against Bluechel, committed on or about February 6, 1950.

In addition to pleas of not guilty to all counts, the defendant entered special pleas of former acquittal and once in jeopardy as to all counts. When he sought to prove, in support of his pleas of once in jeopardy, that his trial under the first

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indictment had subjected him to jeopardy for the crimes of grand theft charged in Counts II, III, IV and V of the present indictment, the district attorney objected to the offer of proof. In ruling the court stated: “The objection of the District Attorney is sustained to the offer of proof in connection with the pleas of former jeopardy and former conviction as to Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5, for the reason that the dates are sufficiently wide apart so far as the pleaded dates in this indictment are concerned and so far as the dates in the other indictment under which the defendant was formerly tried, that even though the dates were not accurately established that the evidence here tends to prove an entirely different series of offenses than those which were tried under the former indictment. The objection is sustained.” The jury returned verdicts of not guilty on Counts I and VI and verdicts of guilty on Counts II, III, IV and V. The appeal is from the judgment of convictions on the four counts.