People v. Beggs

69 Cal.App.2d Supp. 819 (1945) THE PEOPLE, Respondent,

v.

W. J. BEGGS et al., Appellants.

California Court of Appeals.

June 25, 1945. Redmond & Redmond for Appellants.

Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Donald M. Redwine, Assistant City Attorney, and John L. Bland, Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent.

BISHOP, J.

[1] In three separate complaints three groups of defendants were charged, in count one, with wilfully and unlawfully selling "an article of food, to wit: onions, which was then and there mislabeled and misbranded, in that its label represented the contents of the container in which it was packed to be greater in quantity and weight than they in truth and in fact were." These allegations state a public offense under section 26510 of the Health and Safety Code (Stats. 1943, p. 2635) which provides: "The ... selling ... of any article of food which is ... misbranded is prohibited," for section 26490 of the same code declares: "A food shall be deemed to be misbranded: (1) If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular."

[2] The evidence warranted the trial court in reaching these conclusions: The onions involved in these cases were grown in Texas and were shipped to Los Angeles in sacks bearing labels which read: "Texas Onions 50 lbs. net weight." The shippers had been directed to fill the sacks so that they contained more than fifty pounds of onions, but in fact most of the sacks never had contained as much as fifty pounds of onions. None of the defendants weighed the sacks of onions which they sold until after the sales were made and the sealer of weights and measures had intervened. The defendant Cornett sold sacks of onions labelled as though containing fifty pounds each, but which failed to do so, to the Los Angeles Potato Distributors, Inc., a corporation, which, in turn, acting through defendants Harry Alouzet and Felix Marina, sold [69 Cal.App.2d Supp. 822] them to Haddad Bros. Produce Company. Defendant Cornett also sold some of these misbranded sacks to Beggs Bros. Produce Company, a business operated by defendants W. J. and Nat Beggs, on whose behalf and with whose knowledge defendant Jones resold the sacks to Balsano Produce Company.

The conclusions just set forth support the convictions of the several defendants on the first count. [3] Neither knowledge nor an intent to defraud is made a condition of the statute, with the result that the act of selling misbranded goods constitutes the offense, though done, as it doubtless was in the case before us, both in happy ignorance of the fact that the legend on the sacks was incorrect and without any intention of defrauding anyone. This conclusion is supported by cases analogous to ours, decided in this state (People v. Hartman (1900), 130 Cal. 487, 490 [62 P. 823]; People v. Pera (1918), 36 Cal.App. 292, 304 [171 P. 1091]; People v. Bickerstaff (1920), 46 Cal.App. 764, 770 [190 P. 656]; People v. Sweeney (1944), 66 Cal.App.2d 855, 859 [153 P.2d 371]), and by cases on all fours, decided elsewhere (Commonwealth v. Sacks (1913), 214 Mass. 72 [100 N.E. 1019, Ann.Cas. 1914B 1076, 43 L.R.A.N.S. 1]; Smith v. State (1931), 223 Ala. 346 [136 So. 270, 271]; Woodard v. State (1941), 30 Ala.App. 144 [2 So.2d 330, 332]; State v. Weisberg (1943), 74 OhioApp. 91 [55 N.E.2d 870, 872]; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. District of Columbia (1937), 89 F.2d 502 [67 App.D.C. 30], 505; but see City of Newark v. East Side Coal Co. (1909), 77 N.J.L. 732 [73 A. 484]). [4] The employment of the words "wilfully and unlawfully" in the complaints did not require proof of knowledge or intent not required by the statue. (People v. Settles (1938), 29 Cal.App.2d Supp. 781, 784 [78 P.2d 274].)