Doran v. Dreyer

ASHBURN, J.

Defendant appeals from a judgment for $5,400 principal and $894.50 interest, which is based upon findings that she obtained the $5,400 from plaintiff by fraud in the form of a promise made without any existing intention to perform the same.

Defendant tried the case in propria persona. On appeal she requests through present counsel that “in the best interests of justice” this court “extend further latitude to appellant than would ordinarily be the case, in interpretation of the transcript and records of the trial in the lower court. ’ ’ This request misconceives the applicable rule. “A litigant has a right to act as his own attorney

(Gray

v.

Justice’s Court,

18 Cal.App.2d 420 [63 P.2d 1160]) ‘but, in so doing, should be restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as is required of those qualified to practice law before our courts; otherwise, ignorance is unjustly rewarded.’

(Knapp

v.

Fleming,

127 Colo. 414 [258 P.2d

489]; Monastero

v.

Los Angeles Transit Co.,

131 Cal.App.2d 156, 160-161 [280 P.2d 187].) The Supreme Court of Arizona, in

Ackerman

v.

Southern Arizona Bank & Trust Co.,

39 Ariz. 484 [7 P.2d 944], stated the principle in this language: ‘A layman with resources who insists upon exercising the privilege of representing himself must expect and receive the same treatment as if represented by an attorney—no different, no better, no worse.’ To that same effect is

Biggs

v.

Spader,

411 Ill. 42 [103 N.E.2d 104]. The fact that a layman elects to represent himself ‘certainly does not excuse him from a failure of proof’ of his cause of action.

(Pete