Brink v. Brink

WOOD (Fred B.), J.

The sole question is whether or not by applying for and obtaining a final decree of divorce plaintiff revived his obligation to pay defendant $1,800 (a part of their property settlement agreement which had been incorporated into the interlocutory decree of divorce), an obligation which defendant concedes was discharged by an order of the bankruptcy court made after the interlocutory and before the final divorce decree.

Holding that the obligation was not revived, reaffirmed or reacknowledged, the trial court ordered quashed a writ of execution which had been issued to enforce payment of the obligation.

*

We find no basis for a reversal of that order.

We start with the premise that the property rights of these parties were defined and determined by the inter

[529]

locutory decree and that where, as here, that decree has become final the court retains no power to modify it with respect to these property rights.

(Dupont

v.

Dupont,

4 Cal.2d 227, 228 [48 P.2d 677] ;

Leupe

v.

Leupe,

21 Cal.2d 145, 148 [130 P.2d 697] ;

Harrold

v.

Harrold,

127 Cal.App.2d 582, 583 [274 P.2d 183];

Parnham

v.

Parnham,

32 Cal.App.2d 93, 96 [89 P.2d 189].) “Even though a final decree is not entered, the interlocutory decree becomes a conclusive adjudication and is res adjudicata with respect to all issues determined.’’

(Leupe