Cirimele v. Shinazy

WOOD (Fred B.), J.

This is plaintiff’s second appeal in this action for the collection of rent which accrued pursuant to the provisions of a written lease. Upon the first appeal we reversed the judgment with directions that the trial court ‘ ascertain and determine the amount of a reasonable attorney fee as a part of plaintiff’s damages, amend the findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with this decision, including an award of $862.50 (instead of $612.50 and in addition to the attorney fee) for moneys due plaintiff from the defendant, and thereupon to enter judgment in accordance with the findings and conclusions as thus amended.”

(Cirimele

v.

Shinazy,

124 Cal.App.2d 46, 53 [268 P.2d 210].)

In carrying out these directions the trial court awarded plaintiff the sum of $862.50 plus an attorney fee in the sum of $100 “for the trial of the action.”

Plaintiff complains that $100 is so disproportionately small that its award is an abuse of discretion. He asks this court to' fix it in a larger sum. We cannot say, under the circumstances presented, that the trial court did abuse its discretion in this regard; $100 represented 40 per cent of the amount ($250) which plaintiff recovered over and above the amount ($612.50) which the defendant admitted he owed and payment of which he tendered by check when he filed his answer. The issues were not complicated nor was the trial prolonged. (The reporter’s transcript upon the first appeal

[52]

was only 51 pages in length.) Plaintiff stresses the fact that a good deal of legal work was caused by defendant’s successful motion for change of venue from San Francisco to San Mateo. That work the trial court well may have considered plaintiff brought upon himself by filing the action in San Francisco despite the fact that the demised premises are situated in San Mateo County and both parties reside in that county. The “reasonable attorney fee” for which the lease provides in case suit is brought for recovery of rent is not necessarily gauged by the legal services actually rendered. It is limited to reasonable compensation for legal services that are reasonably necessary under the circumstances of a case.