CURTIS, J. Petitioner herein is an inmate of the State Prison at Folsom, California. He is now, and has been ever since the 7th day of June, 1928, in the custody of the warden under and by virtue of a warrant issued out of the Superior Court of Sacramento. By said warrant the warden of said State Prison was commanded to cause petitioner to be put -to death in the manner and by the means then provided by the laws of this state for the execution of the death sentence.
Upon application of petitioner and on March 11, 1931, Hon. James Rolph, Jr., as Governor of the State of California, commuted “the sentence of death imposed on Albert M. Stewart on condition that he be imprisoned during the term of his natural life in the State Prison at Folsom.” At a later date, after petitioner had served a considerable period of time beyond seven years of his life sentence, he applied for parole under the Parole Law of 1913 and section 1168 of the Penal Code. The parole law or statute was incorporated into the Penal Code in 1941, and section 3046 of said code provides as did the Parole Law of 1913 that “no prisoner imprisoned under a life sentence may be paroled until he has served at least seven calendar years.” Section 1168 provides for the indeterminate sentence. In response to petitioner’s application for parole, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles informed him that “due to the particular wording of your commutation of sentence, which said in effect ‘for your natural life,’ ... no action can be taken on a parole application in your case by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles until such time as this provision is removed from the record.”
On February 21, 1944, petitioner filed herein his petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the purpose of testing his right to a hearing before the board upon his application for parole, and to “be restored to his lawful rights.” Respondents do not question the applicability of the remedy now [346]sought by petitioner to determine his right to a hearing upon said application before the board. This court granted the writ. The respondents have filed their return thereto. The facts are not in dispute and are substantially as set out above. The only problem before us is to determine the meaning of the words “during the term of his natural life” as used by Governor Rolph in his order commuting petitioner’s, sentence.,
Petitioner contends that there is no difference between a term of imprisonment for life and one for the natural life of the prisoner; that if a prisoner is sentenced to prison for life he must serve during his entire natural life, unless sooner pardoned or placed on parole; and that had Governor Rolph intended that petitioner should serve his life sentence without parole, it would have been a simple matter for him to have inserted in his order the words “without parole” or words of similar import. On the other hand, the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, as its members are advised by the attorney general, contends that some effect must be given to the word “natural” as used in Governor Rolph’s order of commutation; that had the Governor intended that petitioner should serve only an ordinary life sentence, as that term is usually used in criminal judgments, he would not have taken the pains to definitely state that petitioner “should be imprisoned during the term of his natural life”; and that had the Governor intended that petitioner’s term of imprisonment was to be subject to parole, he could easily have, and no doubt would have, so stated in his order.
Our attention has been directed to but a single instance in which the words “imprisonment during his natural life” have been used in our Penal Code, and that is in section 671, which reads as follows :
“Imprisonment for life: Whenever any person is declared punishable for a crime by imprisonment in the state prison for a term not less than any specified number of years, and no limit to the duration of such imprisonment is declared, the court authorized to pronounce judgment upon such conviction may, in its discretion, sentence such offender to imprisonment during his natural life, or for any number of years not less than that prescribed.”
Evidently the term “natural life,” as used in this section of the code, cannot be given the meaning claimed for it by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles, and it is just as evi[347]dent that it is used in this section as synonymous with the word “life.” No one, we think, would contend for a moment that a prisoner sentenced, under this provision of the code would not be entitled to the benefit of the parole law of the state.
There has been received in evidence at this hearing a certified copy of an order by Governor Eolph of date July 12, 1932, commuting a death sentence to life imprisonment, which in part reads as follows:
“I, James Eolph, Jr., Governor of the State of California, by virtue of the authority conferred upon me, do hereby commute the sentence of Baymond C. West to imprisonment for life, provided, however, this commutation is made upon the following conditions: His imprisonment shall be for the term of his natural life. During his imprisonment, he will faithfully comply with, all the rules and regulations governing the penitentiary wherein he may be imprisoned. He will not hereafter be released from imprisonment and will not apply for parole to the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles or to any Board, Commission or officer authorized by law to grant parole, nor will he during his imprisonment accept parole from any such Board, Commission or Officer.”
While each of the two orders of Governor Eolph provide for imprisonment for the natural life of the prisoner, we think it would be unreasonable to hold that they mean one and the same thing and that they each provide for life imprisonment without parole. On the other hand, as the West order expressly provides for imprisonment for natural life without parole and the order here in question provides simply for imprisonment for natural life, and says nothing about parole, a reasonable construction to be given to the latter order would be that the limitation as to parole was expressly omitted therefrom. The order of Governor Eolph in the West application expressly and meticulously, and we might add laboriously, imposed as a condition upon which the order was made that the prisoner will neither apply for nor accept parole. Had he any intention to impose like limitations upon the order commuting petitioner’s sentence, it is only reasonable to expect that he would have used, if not the same language that is found in the West order, at least some word or words which would indicate that a similar condition was intended to be imposed upon petitioner. Finding none, we [348]think it is apparent that it was not the intention of Governor Rolph, in commuting petitioner’s sentence, to impose as a condition of his order of commutation that petitioner should not be subject to the parole law of the state.
It might further be observed that if the order of commutation in petitioner’s case is ambiguous or uncertain, and is really capable of two constructions equally reasonable, a construction should be given it which would be favorable to the prisoner. The parole law is humanitarian in character and its purpose and object is to mitigate the rigor of the old penitentiary system. (Roberts v. Duffy, 167 Cal. 629, 634 [140 P. 260].)
It is a fundamental rule of law that no citizen should be deprived of his liberty for the violation of a law which is uncertain and ambiguous (In re Peppers, 189 Cal. 682 [209 P.896]; People v. Pace, 73 Cal.App. 548 [238 P. 1089]) and the same situation exists where one’s liberty is questioned by an order or judgment which is not plain and certain in its terms. (8 CaLJur. 465, § 482; Ex parte Harrison, 63 Cal. 299.) This is especially true where the questioned order or judgment is susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is favorable and the other is adverse to the rights and privileges of the person affected thereby.
It is our opinion, and we therefore hold, that petitioner is entitled to all the benefits and privileges of the parole law of the state and that it is the duty of the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles to grant him a hearing under his application filed with said board. However, this does not entitle petitioner to be released from his present custody by the respondent warden of the State Prison at Folsom, California, and he is therefore hereby remanded to the custody of said warden.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., concurred.