Beckmann v. Beckmann

WARNS, J. pro tem.

*

This is an appeal from a judgment cancelling a deed in an action filed by the respondent’s guardian, whereby certain real property was conveyed to respondent’s daughter, the appellant, during the pendency of proceedings for the commitment of the respondent to a state mental hospital on the grounds that respondent did not have legal capacity to execute a deed, and that the deed was executed as the result of undue influence and without consideration.

The trial court found, among other things, that although the plaintiff was in a weak mental condition due to advanced senility, as a result of which she was confused and disoriented as to time, place, and persons, and suffered from failing memory, particularly as to recent events, nevertheless she was not completely without understanding with regard to any transaction or transactions concerning her own property. However, it further found that the transfer (deed) was wholly without consideration; that a relationship of complete trust and confidence existed between respondent and appellant at all of said times and during the transaction involved herein, and that the conveyance was directly and solely the result of undue influence on the part of the appellant. Upon these findings judgment was entered in favor of respondent wherein it was declared that the deed in question was invalid, null and void, and it was vacated and cancelled of record. Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings and the judgment.

It appears from the record that appellant is respondent’s oldest daughter and that for many years prior to 1939 respondent lived in San Francisco with appellant who was respondent’s main support. In 1939 respondent moved to a small house which she owned near Santa Rosa and which is situated on the property which is the subject of the conveyance in question. The property consists of approximately four acres. Appellant visited her mother practically every weekend and regularly sent her money for her living expenses, while

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respondent’s other children contributed almost nothing to her support, if anything, except small, infrequent gifts.

In the spring of 1955, respondent, who was approximately 80 years of age, evidenced signs of advanced senility. On several occasions she became lost; at times she would be confused and failed to recognize her relatives; she became neglectful of her person; she allowed her house to become untidy, leaving the bed unmade and dishes unwashed; she made irrational accusations against appellant, on one occasion accusing appellant of throwing scissors and rolled paper at her. She told her daughter-in-law that appellant had brought some papers for her to sign but she had vomited on them. Due to respondent’s condition, in May of 1955, her son, Emil, filed a petition under the provisions of section 5047 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to have respondent declared a mentally ill person, and she was placed in the Sonoma County Hospital pending the hearing on said petition. Upon learning of the filing of the petition and the incarceration of her mother, appellant immediately went to Santa Rosa from her home in San Francisco and contacted the district attorney’s office, and upon agreement that appellant would keep her mother with her, the district attorney arranged for respondent’s release. Thereafter they went to the home of their friends, a Mr. and Mrs. Anderson, where they spent the night. They were accompanied by a family friend, Caroline Reid, who likewise spent the night at the Anderson home. Appellant testified that she was not told that there would be a further hearing upon the petition. Mr. Anderson testified that that afternoon respondent asked him if he could get it fixed so that she could turn over her property to appellant as she was going to live with appellant. He told her that he thought it could be arranged by a friend of his who was an attorney. He didn’t think anyone else was present at that time. He further testified that he never discussed the subject matter with appellant and never told her what her mother had said. Later, when all were seated at the dinner table in the Anderson home, the subject matter was mentioned by Mr. Anderson and respondent said, with reference to her property, “Well, Gene [Anderson] is going to get it fixed up for me.” In the course of the same conversation at the dinner table Anderson asked appellant about the description of the property, about the deed, and she said she didn’t have it. Appellant stated that at no time was any conversation whatever held between her and her mother