Anderson v. Superior Court

DOOLING, J.

This is a companion case to

Stern

v.

Superior Court,

this day decided

(ante,

p. 9 [177 P.2d 308]). The evidence before the grand jury as to this defendant, who was jointly indicted with Stern and sixteen others, shows that sever.al pregnant women who desired to be aborted visited the home and place of business of this petitioner in San Francisco, were given a physical examination to establish the

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fact of their pregnancy and were directed to go to the place of business of Stern in Alameda County. Upon some of these women Stern performed abortions and there is evidence that in the case of those so aborted he paid a portion of his fee to this petitioner. The trial court quashed the indictment against this petitioner as to counts 2, 4 and 5, apparently upon the theory that the abortions alleged in those counts were performed before there is any evidence to connect this petitioner with the conspiracy.

In addition to the points made and disposed of in

Stern

v.

Superior Court, supra,

this petitioner argues that if the evidence shows a conspiracy at all, it shows no more than a separate conspiracy between herself and Stern, and is not sufficient to show that she was a party to the general conspiracy alleged in the indictment. She practically concedes that as to counts 6 and 15 of the indictment there is evidence to support those counts against her, since there is evidence that the two abortions alleged in those counts were performed upon women sent by her to Stern for the purpose of having abortions performed upon them. As to the conspiracy count and the other substantive offenses she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.

We are in full accord with the cases cited by petitioner to the effect that a conspiracy between A and B to commit a specific crime or crimes will not make A liable as a conspirator with B and G if B and C enter into a separate conspiracy to commit a different crime or crimes. However it is equally settled that “One who joins a conspiracy after its formation is liable as a conspirator just as are those who originated it” (11 Am.Jur. 548; 15, C.J.S. 1060;