Baker v. Ferrel

DOOLING, J.

Appellants Ferrel Ordnance Inc. and Clyde Ferrel appealed from a judgment against them for $1,570. Respondent is a draftsman who between 1939 and 1942, did certain work for the appellants. Appellant corporation was incorporated to take over the assets and business of Ferrel Ordnance Trust (a Massachusetts trust). 900 shares of the capital stock of appellant corporation were issued to re

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spondent upon his signing the release in October, 1940, which is hereinafter discussed. On January 9, 1942, appellant Ferrel gave respondent a memorandum in writing acknowledging an agreement to give respondent 7,500 shares of appellant corporation (inclusive of the 900 already issued) “in settlement of all your claims to and against the Ferrel Ordnance Inc.” The corporation refused to issue the stock pursuant to this agreement and respondent commenced this action seeking to recover $6,600 (the par value of 6,600 shares of stock at $1.00 per share) as the balance due for the services performed. . Appellants filed answers denying the allegations of the complaint.

The court found that respondent had expended 986 hours in said work, that the reasonable value of such work was $2.50 per hour, that $900 was paid on account of such work in the form of stock certificates having a par value in that amount and that there was a balance due of $1,570.

The appeal of appellant Ferrel Ordnance Inc. has been dismissed for failure to pay its franchise tax.

(Boyle

v.

Lakeview Creamery Co.,

9 Cal.2d 16 [68 P.2d 968].)

On appeal it is claimed that there is no evidence to support a finding that the work performed had a reasonable value of $2.50 per hour. Respondent testified that the reasonable value of his work was $2.50 to $3.00 per hour. The court accepted the lesser figure. The fact that respondent had been paid for some earlier work at the rate of $2.00 per hour at most created a conflict for the resolution of the trial court.

Respondent testified to work done for appellants during the period in suit covering 1,013% hours. He conceded that 27 hours of service rendered following the execution of the memorandum of January 9, 1942 should be excluded. This left 986% hours. The court disregarded the half hour in its findings.